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ACUTE POVERTY: The Fatal Flaw in 
U.S. Anti-Poverty Law 
David A. Super* 
Debates over inequality have largely ignored the largest body of people living in poverty. 
Although anti-poverty policymaking focuses overwhelmingly on the chronic poor, a far larger number 
of people suffer occasional acute bouts of poverty. The causes of the acute poor’s problems, and their 
needs, differ significantly from those of the chronic poor. Even short spells of poverty can cause 
serious, physical, psychological, and material harm as well as impairment in their ability to return 
to their former circumstances. 
Demographically, the acute poor resemble the general population far more than the chronic 
poor, yet they receive little sympathy: politicians may praise them in the abstract, but all too often 
the acute poor become collateral damage in struggles over the treatment of the chronic poor. The 
standard model of public welfare law, which is built around avoiding moral hazard, ill-fits the 
acute poor. A combination of eligibility limits, arduous procedures, deliberate stigmatization, 
waiting lists, and conduct requirements reduces the chronic poor’s receipt of aid but often affects the 
acute poor even more powerfully. More recently, some politicians have begun to attack the acute poor 
directly. The acute poor pay for the safety net in good times but cannot access it in bad. 
Replacing the standard model of public welfare law would allow limited public funds to better 
serve all low-income people, acute and chronic alike. Greater attention to the acute poor would 
reduce their hardship and could lead to reexamination of some overly simplistic ideas about the 
chronic poor as well. 
  
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. The author is grateful for the research assistance of Monica 
Martinez and Thanh Nguyen, for the comments of participants in workshops at the law schools of 
Columbia, Emory, Georgetown and Michigan, and for the careful and insightful editing of Michelle 
Avidisyans and Lauren Navarro. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Census Bureau data released in 2018 showed broad income growth at a pace 
not seen since the late 1990s, with real median income rising sharply for the third 
consecutive year.1 Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the United States had eleven 
consecutive years of economic growth. The official unemployment rate was below 
4% after many years above 5% since the end of the 1990s boom.2 The dollar was 
strong,3 the housing sector was booming,4 stock prices were at or near record highs,5 
and the federal deficit had been shrinking rapidly away before Congress deliberately 
increased it with a huge tax cut.6 With the economies of Europe and Japan in the 
doldrums, and Brazil, China, and other formerly fast-growing countries hitting the 
skids, this country’s economy should have been the envy of the world. 
Yet discontent was widespread. Polls about the direction of the country 
consistently said that we were on the wrong track by almost twenty percentage 
points.7 In the last presidential election, an apparent long-shot populist candidate 
channeling widespread anger came close to upending the establishment in one of 
our major political parties; another did so in the other party and then stunned 
political experts by winning the presidency. Along the way, radical third parties’ 
presidential candidates were polling 10% deep into September, when voters usually 
have coalesced around the major party nominees.8 Although President Trump is 
polarizing in the near-term, groups on both the Left and the Right are so angry they 
 
1. KAYLA FONTENOT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-263, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2017, at 5 (2018). Median income in 2018 continued to rise, albeit by a statistically 
insignificant amount. JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-266, INCOME AND 
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 3 (2019). 
2. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-20-0180, THE EMPLOYMENT  
SITUATION – JANUARY 2020, at 1–2 (2020). The unemployment rate began rising with the onset of the 
2001 recession and reached 5% in September of that year. 
3. Jeanna Smialek, How the Fed Chairman Is Shielding It from Trump, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 28, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/business/economy/federal-reserve-jay-powell.html 
[https://perma.cc/SZF2-D7TH]; Maggie Fitzgerald, The US Dollar Just Hit a Two-Year High and Is 
Threatening to Make Another Major Milestone, CNBC (Sept. 3, 2019, 9:03 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/03/the-us-dollar-just-hit-a-two-year-high-and-is-threatening-to-
make-another-major-milestone.html [https://perma.cc/V8NE-AX72]. 
4. Kathy Orton, Experts Predict What the 2020 Housing Market Will Bring, WASH. POST  
( Jan. 6, 2020, 10:05 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/06/experts-predict-
what-housing-market-will-bring/ [https://perma.cc/HH73-QBUA]. 
5. Herbert Lash, Stocks Surge to Record Highs on Hopes Virus Is Peaking, Gold Ebbs, REUTERS 
(Feb. 11, 2020, 4:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets/stocks-surge-to-
record-highs-on-hopes-virus-is-peaking-gold-ebbs-idUSKBN20501G [https://perma.cc/BS98-546L]. 
6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 52801, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: 2017 TO 2027, at 10 (2017). 
7. Direction of Country, REALCLEARPOLITICS, https://realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/
direction_of_country-902.html [https://perma.cc/SZ3W-QFS5] ( last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
8. General Election: Trump vs. Clinton vs. Johnson vs. Stein, REALCLEARPOLITICS, http://
www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton_vs_ 
johnson_vs_stein-5952.html [https://perma.cc/GB3V-4TGJ] ( last visited Sept. 14, 2016). 
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are coming close to calling a second constitutional convention,9 which could put 
the very fabric of our democracy up for grabs.10 
The primary source of this discontent, despite all the rosy statistics, is 
economic. Bernie Sanders won enthusiastic support with forceful criticism of 
economic inequality, and inequality was central to many candidates’ 2020 
campaigns. This message clearly resonated with the lived experience of  
many people. 
Economic dissatisfaction is at the core of Donald Trump’s ascendancy as well. 
A good deal of his message was one of economic revival. But even the other aspects 
of his appeal have a strong hidden economic component. Trump supporters 
disproportionately feel politically marginalized,11 but even the focus of this anger is 
economic: they believe that the elites have rigged the economy against them. 
President Trump’s support also depended significantly on racial animus, with strong 
evidence suggesting that hostility to African-Americans is the single best predictor 
of support for his candidacy.12 But racism has been endemic throughout this 
country’s history; the effectiveness of race-based appeals varies depending on the 
general level of unease among the whites to whom those appeals are made.13 
Intensity of xenophobia, too, rises and falls with economic insecurity. The persistent 
unemployment that followed the Great Recession left those with latent racial 
resentments claiming that “their” jobs had gone to people of color. This made them 
receptive to the Tea Party’s appeals.14 Although President Trump did not follow the 
Tea Party script—his professed reluctance to cut major middle-class entitlements 
 
9. See States Calling for an Article V Convention, BBA TASK FORCE, http://bba4usa.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/C4BL-2SXF] ( last visited April 2, 2020) (claiming to be only six states short of 
compelling Congress to call a convention). 
10. David Super, A Constitutional Convention Would Be a Brexit-Scale Crisis for the U.S.,  
L.A. TIMES ( July 7, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-super-constitutional-
convention-balanced-budget-amendment-20160706-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/2FSZ-
W85Y]. 
11. Michael Pollard & Joshua Mendelsohn, RAND Kicks Off 2016 Presidential Election Panel 
Survey, RAND ( Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/rand-kicks-off-2016-
presidential-election-panel-survey.html [https://perma.cc/L9GQ-FMVY] (finding that voters 
believing that people like them lack a political voice were 86% more likely to support Trump). 
12. Jason McDaniel & Sean McElwee, Racial Resentment and the Rise of Donald Trump,  
W. POL. SCI. ASS’N: NEW W. (Mar. 27, 2016), https://thewpsa.wordpress.com/2016/03/27/racial-
resentment-and-the-rise-of-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/8PQV-GJER]. 
13. For example, the economic dislocations of the early 1970s allowed George Wallace, a 
prominent opponent of civil rights, to win the Michigan Democratic primary in 1972 and do well in 
working-class neighborhoods around the country. JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE PRICE OF  
CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN VIRTUE AND PROSPERITY 69 (2011). Going back further, 
years of virulent racist assaults on federal protection of freed slaves in the South finally won an end to 
Reconstruction when the Long Depression, beginning in 1873, stoked insecurity among  
northern whites. 
14. See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND THE RISE OF THE TEA PARTY 
MOVEMENT 11–12 (2011), http://faculty.washington.edu/jwilker/353/AbramowitzTea.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/W6CG-K84M] (finding racial animus an important determinant of support for the Tea 
Party movement). 
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such as Social Security and Medicare fits badly with the Tea Party’s avowed 
commitment to small government—his message that white Americans’ jobs were 
being lost to people of color within and outside our borders fit that resentment 
even better.15 
The intensity of this sense of economic grievance has perplexed most of the 
political and economic establishment, in part because it does not correspond to the 
measures of economic well-being that they are accustomed to tracking. Democrats 
complain that President Obama did not receive the credit he was due for vast 
improvements in the economy since he took office.16 Republicans are perplexed 
that they lost the 2018 midterm elections despite historically low unemployment. 
Democrats insist the lower-middle-class voters that put Donald Trump over the top 
in key swing states ought to have been more grateful to Democrats, in particular for 
the Affordable Care Act; Republicans insist that Democrats have neglected these 
voters but are privately anxious that they have little to offer them.17 Both seem 
deeply confused about the source of popular anger. Economically anxious voters 
see the political and economic elite as dismissive of their problems and gravitate 
increasingly to outsiders almost without regard to those candidates’ programs.18 
Notwithstanding elites’ befuddlement, economic insecurity is a real and 
growing problem in this country—and one that the dominant model of anti-poverty 
law has failed miserably to address. The Great Recession, although not matching 
the Great Depression’s total impact, nonetheless transformed much of society, 
spawning staggering amounts of long-term unemployment and eliminating 
industries that had long provided a stable, decent standard of living to millions of 
low-skilled workers.19 The shift from manufacturing to the service economy 
typically costs men without college degrees 15–20% of their wages.20 In the decade 
 
15. Indeed, President Trump seems to have reengaged a crucial part of the coalition that helped 
Franklin Roosevelt enact the New Deal: those that support generous social welfare programs for whites 
while denying aid to people of color. Paul Krugman, Trump in a Box, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE 
OF A LIBERAL (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:48 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/trump-in-
a-box/ [https://perma.cc/29TR-DL2X]. 
16. In 2008, candidate Obama spoke condescendingly about low-skilled, small-town workers as 
bitterly clinging to unrealistic economic hopes and turning to guns, religion, and xenophobia for solace. 
Michael Saul, Obama: Some Pennsylvanians ‘Bitter,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 12, 2008, 4:53 PM), https://
www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obama-pennsylvanians-bitter-article-1.283600 [https://
perma.cc/7XEQ-3AHU]. 
17. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, In Private, Republican Lawmakers Agonize over Health Law 
Repeal, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/affordable-
care-act-republican-retreat.html [https://perma.cc/B3P2-ZXM4]. 
18. Significant numbers of Trump voters reported that Sanders was their second choice, and 
vice versa. Thomas B. Edsall, The Trump-Sanders Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/opinion/campaign-stops/the-trump-sanders-
fantasy.html [https://perma.cc/7VUD-JMZJ]. 
19. DOUGLAS E. SCHOEN, HOPELESSLY DIVIDED: THE NEW CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR 2012 AND BEYOND 2 (2012) [hereinafter SCHOEN,  
HOPELESSLY DIVIDED] . 
20. JARED BERNSTEIN, CRUNCH: WHY DO I FEEL SO SQUEEZED (AND OTHER UNSOLVED 
ECONOMIC MYSTERIES) 21 (2008). 
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prior to the Great Recession, the cost of childcare rose at twice the rate of inflation, 
college tuition at almost three times, and the median homes and out-of-pocket 
health care costs at three times the rate.21 To the extent that families’ real incomes 
have risen, it is because of increased earnings from women, which has reduced their 
capacity to provide extremely valuable if unmonetized labor in the home.22 
The four years immediately following the Great Recession—from 2009 to 
2012—saw historically low income mobility.23 Those with lower incomes were the 
most likely to have their incomes stagnate or decline.24 The occupations expected 
to add the most jobs in coming years are disproportionately at the low end of the 
pay scale.25 With the number of low-skilled jobs insufficient to accommodate the 
number of workers needing them, employers have been able to erode both the 
wages and the dignity of these positions.26 Wage theft, arbitrary discipline, 
uncorrected workplace hazards, and involuntary conversion to sham independent 
contractor status all drive home a message of powerlessness to these workers.27 
Even more important than reduced incomes is the grinding insecurity that 
low-skilled workers faced even when the economy was strong. Although many have 
noted that low-skilled workers’ real wages began to stagnate around 1970, few have 
pointed out that the volatility of their incomes began to grow at the same time.28 
Years after the recovery had been underway, this dislocation still caused  
three-quarters of voters to report that the economy was stagnant or getting worse, 
with most reporting that the uncertainty was adversely affecting their family lives.29 
Among those making less than $75,000 per year in 2011, one-quarter to one-third 
had trouble paying for housing or health care or feared a pay cut or layoff in the 
coming year.30 These fears were well-founded: although only 2.7% of the population 
was constantly poor during the four years following the Great Recession,31 more 
than one-third of the population had a spell of poverty lasting at least two months 
during that period.32 Although most recover, that is by no means  
 
21. Id. at 23. 
22. Id. at 22–23. 
23. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  
P60-249, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 4 (2014) [hereinafter  
DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 ]. 
24. Id. 
25. TAMARA DRAUT, SLEEPING GIANT: HOW THE NEW WORKING CLASS WILL TRANSFORM 
AMERICA 21 (2016). 
26. Id. at 19–39. 
27. Id. at 47–61. 
28. Benjamin J. Keys, Trends in Income and Consumption Volatility, 1970-2000, in INCOME 
VOLATILITY AND FOOD ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (Dean Jolliffe & James P. Ziliak 
eds., 2008). 
29. SCHOEN, HOPELESSLY DIVIDED, supra note 19, at 8. 
30. Id. at 39. 
31. DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, 
supra note 23, at 4. 
32. Id. 
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guaranteed: personal economic crises often lead to long-term poverty.33 Even 
relatively short spells of poverty do direct damage to those involved and undermine 
their sense of security about the future. 
Nor do they have much to look forward to farther down the road. Raising the 
retirement age to reduce social insurance outlays and press people to work longer 
has long been an article of faith among conservatives and many moderates. Now 
influential liberals have taken up the call, even while acknowledging that the  
lower-skilled workers that most depend on retirement benefits are also those least 
likely to be able to keep working or to find employment if they try.34 
Responding to the power of large campaign donors, both political parties 
embrace policies that redistribute wealth regressively, to the detriment of  
lower-skilled workers clinging to middle-class status.35 Politicians’ measurable 
responsiveness to voters’ sentiment has plummeted.36 Polls show large numbers of 
voters, often majorities, believing that the U.S. government no longer represents its 
people.37 Middle-class voters’ pessimism about the future may be unprecedented in 
this country.38 
The social costs are enormous. High income inequality correlates with a wide 
array of social ills, including homicide rates, teenage birth rates, prison populations, 
and substance abuse.39 Even more fundamentally, it leads to loss of faith in 
government and the social cohesion that makes a society governable40 and the trust 
in financial institutions that allows the economic system to function efficiently.41 
Understanding how inequality leads to this decay is, however, crucial. It undermines 
the institutions that people depend on in their daily lives: not just workplaces but 
also schools, religious congregations, local public services, and ultimately families.42 
Alas, our discourse on poverty, and our public programs, are ill-equipped to 
recognize the very real suffering of the economically insecure. When we think of 
poverty, we imagine a grim, crowded urban ghetto of dilapidated housing and few 
 
33. Hilary W. Hoynes et al., Long Run Impacts of Childhood Access to the Safety Net (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18535, 2012) (finding anti-poverty programs promote  
social mobility). 
34. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & STEVEN A. SASS, WORKING LONGER: THE SOLUTION TO THE 
RETIREMENT INCOME CHALLENGE 145 (2008). 
35. SACHS, supra note 13, at 114–15. 
36. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND 
UNEQUAL RICHES 172–74 (2006). 
37. SCHOEN, HOPELESSLY DIVIDED, supra note 19, at 25–26. 
38. Id. at 47. 
39. DOUGLAS E. SCHOEN, THE END OF AUTHORITY: HOW A LOSS OF LEGITIMACY AND 
BROKEN TRUST ARE ENDANGERING OUR FUTURE 120 (2013); Kate E. Pickett et al., Adolescent Birth 
Rates, Total Homicides, and Income Inequality in Rich Countries, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1181 (2005). 
40. Pickett et al., supra note 39. 
41. Id. at 122. 
42. Id. at 121. 
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jobs,43 run-down migrant labor camps,44 decaying villages in Appalachia, isolated 
settlements on Native American reservations, or shotgun shacks on obscure 
backroads in the South.45 A few more sophisticated people may think of declining 
inner-ring suburbs and bleak bedroom communities on the edges of our most 
affluent metropolitan areas. 
Missing from these visions is economic insecurity and its consequence: acute, 
or episodic, poverty experienced by individuals and families that were living largely 
free of extreme want who are suddenly thrust into poverty because of a plant 
closure, an accident, a divorce, or an argument with the boss. Their hardship is very 
real, and the harm they suffer may be very long-lasting. Indeed, their nominal 
incomes may actually overstate their ability to meet their immediate needs as they 
struggle to keep up with monthly obligations assumed during better times. 
The large group of economically vulnerable people who usually have incomes 
above the poverty line but occasionally face acute economic distress should be a 
major focus of political debates and of anti-poverty legislation. Their  
needs—short-term purchasing power—should be simpler and less expensive to 
meet. Doing so would have the effect of social insurance, with the taxes these 
families pay in good times more than sufficient to cover the costs of aid they need 
when in distress. And far more than the chronically poor, their loyalties are divided 
between the two major political parties.46 
Yet serious attention to the plight of the acute poor has been largely absent 
from our national discourse about poverty and inequality. Anti-poverty law has 
resolutely relied on a two-prong model that assumes people’s economic conditions 
are largely static: major social insurance programs serve those permanently unable 
to work due to age or disability while means-tested programs make meager 
provision for chronically impoverished families. Discussions of economic mobility 
tend to assume that people have long been poor and limit their focus to how, after 
many years, they finally escaped.47 Occasionally critics of the chronic poor will hold 
up the acute poor as a supposed model for emulation.48 At other times, advocates 
on one or the other side of debates on the chronic poor will try to push the line 
dividing acute from chronic poverty in one direction or the other to make  
 
43. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW 
URBAN POOR (1996). 
44. See, e.g., RONALD B. TAYLOR, SWEATSHOPS IN THE SUN: CHILD LABOR ON THE FARM 
(1973). 
45. See generally CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN, RURAL POVERTY IN AMERICA (1992). 
46. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES 
WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (describing economically insecure families’ support for 
Republicans). 
47. See, e.g., KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 16 (rev. ed. 1999). 
48. See, e.g., Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona’s Child-Welfare System Still In Crisis, ARIZ. REPUBLIC 
(May 11, 2013, 1:02 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/ 
20121223arizonas-child-welfare-system-still-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/7BFV-ZL7Y]. 
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low-income people look better or worse.49 More recently, critics of the chronic poor 
have begun to argue that the acute poor, too, are morally blameworthy and hence 
deserve their hardship.50 
Thoughtful proposals about how to ameliorate the hardship of the 
economically insecure have been rare. In political rhetoric and in the design of our 
anti-poverty programs, the two-prong model reigns supreme and the acute poor are 
commonly collateral casualties in battles fought over chronic poverty. 
The distinction between acute and chronic need has long been familiar in the 
context of health care programs. Although acute care services receive most of the 
attention, and are typically the prime targets for budget cuts, almost two-thirds of 
Medicaid expenditures go for long-term care and services to beneficiaries receiving 
such care.51 To keep Medicare (relatively) affordable to the federal government, its 
long-term care benefit is designed to exclude those with chronic needs, shifting the 
burden to Medicaid (and, in part, to states).52 Some major health care reform 
proposals made their budget numbers fit by avoiding, or making impractical 
proposals concerning, long-term care;53 even the Affordable Care Act largely left 
the rules for providing long-term care as it found them. 
That distinction, however, has not penetrated discussions of poverty and 
human needs more generally. In particular, this country has paid strikingly little 
attention to the tens of millions of people who become poor, often extremely poor, 
for discrete periods of time in response to conditions that are unlikely to persist 
indefinitely. Although the dividing line between acute and chronic poverty can at 
times be difficult to discern precisely—and particularly harsh bouts of acute poverty 
can trigger chain reactions that lead to chronic poverty—the acute poor have 
distinct sets of characteristics and needs that our policies built for the chronic poor 
often address badly, if at all. 
 
49. See, e.g., MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC 
TO REFORM (1994). 
50. See, e.g., PAUL KERSEY & TIM KANE, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER  
#1754: THE WRONG TIME TO EXTEND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1 (2004) (decrying UC’s 
“perverse incentives” and suggesting that recipients are unlikely to accept work until benefits run out). 
51. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID 3 
(2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3BF5-C3Z7]. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A), (f) (2018). 
53. Andrew Mollison, Four of 8 Health Reform Plans Rated Favorably, PALM BEACH POST, May 
18, 1994, at 13A. 
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Scholarly discourse on poverty overwhelmingly focuses on the chronic poor. 
This is true of historical accounts,54 social scientific analyses,55 and case studies.56 
Thus, for example, sociologist William Julius Wilson and economist Rebecca Blank 
believe that poverty results significantly from economic and demographic upheavals 
that have shifted jobs out of the inner cities57 and that increasing the availability of 
jobs, childcare, and other subsidies for low-wage workers is crucial.58 Economist 
David Ellwood also attributes poverty to broader societal changes, although he 
emphasizes family structure more.59 These factors could be seen as increasing the 
likelihood of episodes of acute poverty, but discussion focuses largely on the 
number of people in chronic poverty. 
Ellwood and Blank offer a long list of augmentations to existing programs 
keyed to politically popular themes such as rewarding work, collecting child support, 
and educating youth as well as transforming urban ghettoes;60 Ellwood emphasizes 
that his problem is with the chronic poor by proposing time limits on welfare 
(although he would guarantee employment for anyone reaching that time limit).61 
Wilson believes that European consensus-based interest-group politics make a 
meaningful response to poverty much easier than in the divisive U.S. political 
climate but that policy experts can design programs “to which the more advantaged 
groups of all races and class backgrounds can positively relate.”62 Ellwood believes 
that clever policy experts can design policies that can build a broad consensus by 
avoiding the trade-offs that have previously divided us.63 “‘Ending poverty’ is not a 
likely outcome in the foreseeable future,” writes Blank, but believes a broad 
coalition, spanning all levels of government, the private sector, and conscientious 
 
54. E.g., PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERICA’S HEART: RFK AND THE RENEWAL 
OF HOPE 5-6 (2001); RON HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE (2006); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE 
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986) [hereinafter 
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE ]; WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO 
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA (5th ed. 1994). 
55. E.g., KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS 
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK (1997); HARRY J. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS  
WANT: JOB PROSPECTS FOR LESS-EDUCATED WORKERS (1996); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO 
SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER CITY (1999); WILSON, supra note 43. 
56. E.g., JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A NATION’S 
DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) 
GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001); DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN: A PULITZER 
PRIZE-WINNING JOURNALIST’S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE (1997). 
57. REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY 
13–82 (1997); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 140–46 (1987). 
58. BLANK, supra note 57, at 252–89; WILSON, supra note 57, at 146–59, 163–64. 
59. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY  
45–80 (1988). 
60. BLANK, supra note 57, at 252–89; ELLWOOD, supra note 59, at 104–27, 155–85, 220–30. 
61. ELLWOOD, supra note 59, at 178–83. 
62. WILSON, supra note 57, at 155–63. 
63. ELLWOOD, supra note 59, at 242–43. 
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individuals, can make progress.64 Law professor Peter Edelman decries the 
simplistic view most Americans have of poverty—neglecting in particular 
concentrated poverty and deep poverty—but remains very much within the chronic 
poverty frame.65 
The same obsession with the chronic poor is evident on the ideological right. 
Political scientist Charles Murray and journalist Marvin Olasky tell us that a lack of 
moral character is the driving cause of poverty.66 Political scientist Lawrence Mead 
and economist Martin Anderson focus on what they see as a lack of work effort,67 
perhaps the result of psychological deficiencies68 or insufficient incentives.69 
Murray believes that abolishing federal and state anti-poverty programs is the 
solution70 and bemoans the sentimentality and bad social science that he says hold 
us back from dropping the ax.71 Olasky argues that reducing aid to the poor and 
heavily conditioning what remained would correct that moral decline72 and that 
liberals’ alienation from the actual circumstances of the poor cause them to block 
these reforms.73 Mead would like to see strict work and other conduct requirements 
for the poor74 but believes liberals will never agree to the details required to make 
that happen.75 Anderson proposes similar behavioral requirements as well as 
numerous changes to existing programs that would seek to limit aid to those most 
clearly unable to support themselves;76 he blames the failure to adopt such a plan 
on advocates of a guaranteed minimum income entrenched in “strategic positions 
in government, the media, and academia” but believes bold national leadership 
could overcome them.77 
Some proposals on the left might have somewhat greater impact on the acute 
poor, but even that benefit seems largely incidental to their focus on the chronic 
poor. Law professors Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld reject morality-based 
explanations for poverty78 in favor of the conclusion that poverty results primarily 
 
64. BLANK, supra note 57, at 292–93. 
65. PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT’S SO HARD TO END POVERTY IN  
AMERICA (2012). 
66. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154–66 (1984); MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY 
OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 116–50 (1992). 
67. MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN 
THE UNITED STATES 87–123 (1978); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY  
48–63 (1992). 
68. MEAD, supra note 67, at 12. 
69. ANDERSON, supra note 67, at 43–56. 
70. MURRAY, supra note 66, at 196–218. 
71. Id. at 219–36. 
72. OLASKY, supra note 66, at 149–50. 
73. Id. at 176–94. 
74. MEAD, supra note 67, at 206–09. 
75. Id. at 251–54. 
76. ANDERSON, supra note 67, at 153–65. 
77. Id. at 167. 
78. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY 
& WELFARE 204 (1997). 
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from “the deterioration of the low-wage labor market,”79 find the solution in 
numerous modifications of existing social welfare programs to increase subsidies to 
the working poor,80 and believe that forthright discussion of “major income 
redistribution” can make this possible.81 Sociologists Frances Fox Piven and 
Richard Cloward go further, arguing that poverty is the result of deliberate choices 
to discipline the workforce.82 They would solve the problem with economic policies 
pushing the economy toward full employment or, failing that, through broad 
expansion of the welfare rolls,83 which they hold is possible through organizing.84 
Michael Harrington attributed poverty to isolation, sometimes physical but almost 
always social.85 He urged a combination of enthusiastic engagement with the poor, 
heavy federal spending to replace slums with good housing, and eradication of 
racism,86 and he hoped to achieve that with a “crusade”87 to end the poor’s isolation 
so that the affluent can no longer ignore their plight.88 All of these are 
overwhelmingly prescriptions for the chronic poor alone. 
Two groups of people exist in the space between the persistently poor and the 
economically secure: the stable near-poor and those subject to occasional bouts of 
acute poverty. Over the course of a few years, the total incomes of a stable  
near-poor family and a more comfortable family suffering a bout of acute poverty 
may be quite similar. Yet our public policies treat the two quite differently.  
The stable near-poor are eligible for quite a range of transfer programs. SNAP 
eligibility extends to 130% of the federal poverty income guidelines.89 Pregnant 
women and young children have long been eligible for Medicaid at even higher 
levels.90 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility for certain families 
containing multiple children with severe disabilities also continues well above the 
poverty line.91 The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) can extend past twice the 
poverty line.92 Housing programs, too, have had their eligibility limits raised well 
 
79. Id. at 11. 
80. Id. at 213–24. 
81. Id. at 224–25. 
82. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 34–38 (1971). 
83. Id. at 345–48. 
84. Id. at 330–38. 
85. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES  
86–87 (1962). 
86. Id. at 176–84. 
87. Id. at 176. 
88. Id. at 167–68. 
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)(2) (2018). 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(l) (2018). 
91. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1165 (2018) (establishing rules for counting parental income that can 
result in some families getting partial benefits well above the poverty income level). 
92. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CHART BOOK: THE EARNED INCOME TAX 
CREDIT AND CHILD TAX CREDIT 7 (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-
7-15tax-chartbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPX5-Y8LZ]. 
First to Printer_Super.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/26/20  6:12 PM 
2020] ACUTE POVERTY 1285 
above the poverty line in most of the country.93 The acute poor, by contrast, are 
commonly unable to qualify for benefits through a combination of deliberate and 
accidental policies. 
Understanding our treatment of the acute poor is important in its own right. 
They experience a great deal of preventable hardship. Alleviating that hardship 
should be relatively affordable fiscally, and the greater sympathy they enjoy across 
much of the political spectrum should immunize such initiatives from the worst of 
the vitriol often directed at efforts to combat chronic poverty. Improving treatment 
of the acute poor ought to be as close to “low-hanging fruit” as the world of  
anti-poverty policy has to offer. The coronavirus pandemic and resulting recession 
are highlighting the suffering of many of the acutely poor while laying bare the 
extent of their economic insecurity even before the crisis. 
Understanding the treatment of the acute poor also provides valuable insights 
into how we treat the chronic poor—and why we do so. Many of the acute poor’s 
difficulties result from displaced hostility to the chronic poor. Conversely,  
middle-class voters may recognize the unfairness of rules denying aid to the chronic 
poor more easily when they see those rules’ impact on the acute poor. 
The habit of equating income with class breaks down with respect to the acute 
poor, whose incomes may be low but whose experiences and attitudes may be much 
more middle-class. Seeing income and class separately should yield important 
insights: if we are generous with the more middle-class acute poor, then we can 
more plausibly see this country’s harsh treatment of the chronic poor as reflecting 
class antagonism (and the electorate’s hostility toward the behaviors it has been told 
predominate among low-class chronic poor people). If, on the other hand, we are 
comparably harsh to the acute and chronic poor, we must face the fact that we are 
not as generous a nation as we like to claim. 
Politically, the acute poor provide a natural social and political bridge between 
the chronic poor and middle-class voters. Having experienced something more 
similar to chronic poverty than most of their middle- and upper-income friends can 
readily imagine, they have the potential to be voices of tolerance and empathy, just 
as friends and relatives of openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer 
people have helped radically reduce homophobia in U.S. society over the course of 
just a couple of decades. 
In the broader political arena, sympathy for the acute poor can leaven our 
treatment of the chronic poor. Just as Professor Derrick Bell argued that people of 
color’s interests advance best when those interests coincide best with those of white 
people, low-income people’s interests advance best when aligned with those of 
 
93. See BARRY L. STEFFEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., WORST CASE 
HOUSING NEEDS: 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 3, 63 (2015) (explaining that 30% of area median 
income is typically below the federal poverty income guideline, with most housing aid programs 
granting eligibility well above that level). 
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middle-class voters.94 The seeming otherness of beneficiaries of social welfare 
programs has repeatedly undermined them politically. Most dramatically, after 
President Reagan removed many of the working poor from food stamps and 
particularly AFDC by arguing that aid should target the “truly needy,” House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich successfully cited the absence of working recipients as 
evidence that AFDC was feeding social pathology and should be  
eliminated altogether. 
One approach to this historically has been promoting universal (i.e.,  
non-means-tested) social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and 
unemployment compensation (UC). In theory, acute poverty ought to be an event 
that is highly susceptible to insurance, perhaps even more easily than chronic 
poverty due to old-age or disability. This country, however, has long been 
ambivalent about social insurance.95 We still have no recovered from the folly of 
making employers primarily responsible for providing health insurance, and we have 
extended the same privatizing impulse to several key causes of acute poverty.96 
Workers’ compensation and UC are both employer-funded on terms that give 
employers strong incentives to lobby for more restrictive coverage. Yet despite the 
presence of insurance schemes nominally covering two of the most sympathetic 
causes of acute poverty—workplace injuries and faultless layoffs—gathering 
support for a social insurance program for other causes, or a generic one that 
transcends particular causes, has proven impossible.97 Indeed, even those two 
programs face increasing attacks. 98 
Another response of anti-poverty advocates has been to expand universal 
transfer programs that are not regarded as social insurance, such as school meals 
and the child tax credit (a modest U.S. analogue to the children’s allowance in some 
 
94. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). But see Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105  
NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2015) (acknowledging convergence theory’s contributions but finding significant 
analytical flaws in its treatment of race relations). 
95. A quarter-century ago, Gøsta Esping-Andersen suggested a useful typology of social welfare 
systems. Each of these grew, in different ways, out of primitive poor relief programs. The United States 
adheres to the liberal model, characterized by relatively weak universal programs and strong reliance on 
means-tested public benefits closely controlled to minimize adverse effects on market discipline. 
GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 26–29 (1990). The 
other two models, corporatist and social democratic, predominate in Europe, worry far less about 
disrupting markets, and provide much more robust universal social rights and benefits. Id. When 
someone becomes acutely poor in such a society, many more of her or his basic needs are likely covered 
by social insurance, reducing both hardship and social disruption. 
96. See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2008) 
(dissecting the impulses behind the calls for human services privatization). 
97. Bernie D. Jones, Privately Funded Family Medical Leave?, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 119 (2014) 
(discussing failure to win paid leave for workers responding to family emergencies). 
98. See, e.g., The Associated Press, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Bills Lowering Worker Benefits, Costs, 
MLIVE (Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.mlive.com/politics/2011/12/gov_rick_snyder_signs_bills_lo.h
tml [https://perma.cc/FH2C-NSTF]. 
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European countries).99 But serving the entire population is extremely expensive, and 
for most potential improvements in human services the political drag that higher 
cost brings more than offsets any broadened support. Serving the acute poor in 
programs that primarily benefit the chronic poor, by contrast, is much more 
affordable while still offering opportunities to burnish the program’s image with 
middle-class voters. 
The coronavirus pandemic has painfully laid bare this country’s failure to 
develop effective means of aiding the acute poor. Tens of millions of people who 
thought themselves to be economically stable in January are suddenly destitute in 
April.100 Some conservatives insisted on seeing response to the pandemic through 
the incentive-based lens that dominates policy on chronic poverty: even as 
governors were asking non-essential businesses to close and workers to stay home, 
they told Congress “[d]on’t expand welfare and other income redistribution benefits 
like paid leave and unemployment benefits that will inhibit growth and  
discourage work.”101 
Even when a consensus formed to help the newly unemployed, it found the 
available programs ill-suited to the task. Congress suspended the three-month time 
limit on unemployed people’s eligibility for food assistance,102 but with many 
intermittent workers having already been terminated from the program it is unclear 
how many would realize that they were again eligible. Congress increased 
unemployment compensation benefits and broadened eligibility to include many 
workers in the “gig economy,”103 but insufficient agency staffing,104 prior efforts to 
make benefits less accessible,105 and the requirement that recipients be actively 
seeking work106 threatened to leave many of the newly unemployed destitute. And 
 
99. See ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, NOT FOR THE POOR ALONE: EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL SERVICES (1975). 
100. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES START GRAPPLING WITH HIT TO 
TAX COLLECTIONS (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-2-20sfp.pdf 
 [https://perma.cc/5V3V-T6G3]. 
101. Amanda Terkel, Conservatives Worry Too Much Coronavirus Relief Will Make People Lazy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ron-johnson-coronavirus-
relief_n_5e710d60c5b60fb69ddf3bf1 [https://perma.cc/9UZG-42NK]. 
102. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 2301, 134 Stat. 178 
(2020) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011 note). 
103. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 2102–2116 
(2020) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
104. See, e.g., William Sanders, State Working Through Backlog of Unemployment Claims,  
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Mar. 28, 2020, 2:56 PM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/ 
2020/mar/28/state-working-through-backlog-unemployment-claims/?news-arkansas [https:// 
perma.cc/75LE-PGHJ]. 
105. Gary Fineout & Marc Caputo, Republicans Rage as Florida Becomes a Nightmare for Trump, 
POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2020/04/03/its-
a-sh-sandwich-republicans-rage-as-florida-becomes-a-nightmare-for-trump-1271172  [https:// 
perma.cc/J94N-BM24]. 
106. See Ryan Suppe, Dept. of Labor: Unemployment Claims Up 1,200%, Largest One-Week 
Increase Ever, POST REGISTER (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.postregister.com/coronavirus/dept-of-
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when Congress provided for emergency relief checks to tide the newly unemployed 
through the period of social distancing, it based eligibility on income for 2018 or 
2019, which may have borne little resemblance to workers’ current circumstances.107 
Although some states reopened health care plan enrollment,108 the federal 
government declined to do so109 in the majority of the country where it operates 
health care exchanges.110 This developing tragedy demonstrates that the country 
possesses neither the conceptual nor the institutional tools to address acute  
poverty effectively. 
This Article explores how the two-prong model of anti-poverty law fails the 
acute poor. Part I surveys the surprisingly sparse information we have about acute 
poverty, including its causes, its extent, the ways in which the acute poor diverge 
from images we have of the chronic poor, and our political system’s complex and 
inconsistent reaction to acute poverty. Ironically, by excluding the economically 
insecure from both social insurance and means-tested programs, we have narrowed 
those programs’ political support, leaving them highly vulnerable. Part II shows 
how the dominant model of anti-poverty law fails the acute poor, sometimes by 
design and sometimes by indifference. It also describes pending proposals that 
would double down on those failures. Part III explores what principles ought to 
guide a more robust response to acute poverty. In concluding, the Article briefly 
considers how addressing acute poverty fits into the broader concerns about  
social justice. 
This Article does not contend that the problems of the acute poor are more 
severe, or deserving of greater sympathy, than those of the chronic poor. Copious 
research demonstrates that the ill effects of poverty are cumulative, and as traumatic 
as the acute poor’s descent into poverty will be, the chronic poor have experienced 
that and much more already. The suffering of the acute poor, however, is real, is 
serious, and is deserving of the attention of compassionate people. Moreover, in the 
odd mix of power politics, symbolic politics, and sympathy politics that shapes this 




107. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act § 2301.  
108. Mary Ellen McIntire & Lauren Clason, States Reopen Insurance Enrollment as Coronavirus 
Spreads, ROLL CALL (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/03/13/states-reopen-
insurance-enrollment-as-coronavirus-spreads/ [https://perma.cc/VBU3-MQKP]. 
109. Susannah Luthi, Trump Rejects Obamacare Special Enrollment Period Amid Pandemic, 
POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2020, 6:11 PM),  https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/31/trump-
obamacare-coronavirus-157788 [https://perma.cc/WK5X-34Q9]. 
110. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, State-Based Exchanges, CMS.GOV, 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/state-marketplaces 
[https://perma.cc/8SAC-E4H3] ( last visited April 2, 2020) (reporting that in November 2019, the 
federal government operated health insurance exchanges for thirty-two states). 
111. See David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 YALE L.J. 2806 (2014) 
(arguing that low-income people are rarely effective participants in power politics and depend on the 
ethical sensibility of a handful of officials across the ideological spectrum). 
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can both undermine toxic symbolism and broaden the sympathy needed to improve 
programs’ treatment of all low-income people. 
I. UNDERSTANDING ACUTE POVERTY 
Social policy focuses heavily on individuals and families with incomes so low 
that they consistently have difficulty obtaining life’s basic necessities. On the other 
hand, policymakers are comfortable setting aside those with incomes providing 
consistent security. Between these two groups lie two other sets of people. One 
group—those with stable incomes modestly above the poverty line, the stable  
near-poor—get significant attention. They may receive reduced-price school meals, 
modest earned income tax credits, limited subsidies to help them purchase health 
insurance, and other partial benefits. The other group—those that are usually 
somewhat above the poverty line but occasionally suffer serious reverses—is all but 
invisible. At most, they may be mistaken for the comfortable when their incomes 
are high and for the chronic poor when their incomes are low, but their 
circumstances and needs are quite different from both of these groups. 
This Part seeks better to understand the acute poor, particularly during their 
times of need. 
A. The Extent of Acute Poverty 
Because social scientists overwhelmingly have focused on the chronic poor, 
remarkably little useful data exists on the acute poor. Their presence was known 
anecdotally and could be inferred from the relatively low median spells of 
participation in cash assistance programs and SNAP.112 “Relatively few families are 
immune to the possibility and economic consequences of a bout of unemployment 
or the departure of death of a spouse.”113 Acute poverty is disproportionately high 
in the U.S. compared with other affluent nations.114 
A simplistic measure of the extent of acute poverty would be to compare the 
number of people the Census Bureau reports to be living below the poverty line in 
the peak year of an economic expansion with the number in annual poverty once 
the ensuing recession has had its full effect. Thus, the 36.5 million poor people in 
2006 had risen to 46.3 million by 2010.115 Controlling for population growth, the 
 
112. See JOSHUA LEFTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AG-3198-C-13-0007, DYNAMICS OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION FROM 2008 TO 2012, at 152 
(2014) (finding median spell of participation at twelve months, with shorter medians for households 
not containing elderly members or persons with disabilities). 
113. Greg J. Duncan et al., Poverty and Social Assistance Dynamics in the United States, Canada, 
and Europe, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY: WESTERN STATES AND 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 88 (Katherine McFate et al. eds., 1995). 
114. Markus Jäntti, Mobility in the United States in Comparative Perspective, in CHANGING 
POVERTY, CHANGING POLICIES 186–87 (Maria Cancian & Sheldon Danziger eds., 2009). 
115. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  
P60-252, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 12 fig.4 (2015) [DENAVAS-WALT 
& PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014]. 
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number of people living in poverty in 2010 was 8.7 million greater than it would 
have been had the poverty rate remained what it was in 2006. 
This measure is flawed in several respects. Most obviously, it only addresses 
one of many causes of acute poverty, albeit an important one. It says nothing about 
acute poverty brought on by natural disasters, by economic changes not tied to the 
national business cycle, or by personal calamities. It also says nothing about the 
duration of the spells of poverty experienced in either group: someone living at 
almost twice the poverty line for half the year and having no income at all for the 
other half is indistinguishable from someone with a steady income just below the 
poverty line for the entire year. If one believes that these two experiences are likely 
to be quite different and to call for different public policy responses, one needs a 
measure that differentiates between the two. In addition, the same triggers, such as 
a recession, can cause some people to experience acute poverty while launching 
others into spells of chronic poverty. In part because of this, the poverty rate often 
continues to rise a year or more after a recession has officially ended and then 
declines more slowly than unemployment and other measures of  
economic distress.116 
More insight is available from studies comparing the number of people below 
the poverty line for a single year with those that have multi-year spells of poverty. 
Several studies have found that the number of people experiencing at least one year 
of poverty over a several-year period is several times the number consistently poor 
during that period.117 Nonetheless, acute poverty commonly recurs across 
someone’s lifetime. More than three-quarters of those experiencing one year of 
poverty will experience another at some point in their lives; half will experience five 
or more such years.118 
Indeed, a study of a representative sample of adults during the years of 1968 
through 1992 found that more than half had lived below the poverty line for at least 
one year.119 Almost 85% of African-Americans have spent at least one year in 
poverty before they reach age sixty-five.120 With so many people experiencing 
poverty, we should seek to learn how frequent such bouts of poverty are at any 
given time. 
Yet people do not eat, meet rent or mortgage obligations, or pay utility bills 
annually. Spells of poverty that do not last long enough to pull them below the 
poverty line for an entire year may nonetheless be quite devastating. The Census 
Bureau recently has begun releasing tables on individuals and families that were 
 
116. See id. 
117. Sara Kimberlin & Jill Duerr Berrick, Poor for How Long? Chronic Versus Transient Child 
Poverty in the Unites States, in THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS INTO CHILD AND FAMILY 
POVERTY 143 (Elizabeth Fernandez et al. eds., 2015). 
118. MARK ROBERT RANK, ONE NATION, UNDERPRIVILEGED: WHY AMERICAN POVERTY 
AFFECTS US ALL 92–95 (2004). 
119. Kimberlin & Berrick, supra note 117, at 142–43. 
120. Id. 
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poor for periods of two months or more to complement its traditional presentations 
of families that were in poverty over an entire year.121 Comparing these two groups 
is problematic: the chronic poor are among those with spells of at least two months, 
and some of the acute poor have their incomes drop far enough and long enough 
to fall beneath the poverty line for an entire year. Nonetheless, the differences 
between these two groups are instructive. Between 2009 and 2011, some 89.6 
million people suffered at least one episode of poverty lasting two months or more. 
That is more than twice the average 40.5 million the same survey recorded as living 
below the poverty line on an annual basis during that period.122 More than  
one-quarter of those who were poor during the first month of the period were poor 
for the entire thirty-six months, yet these constituted only 11% of the total number 
experiencing poverty for at least two months during the three years.123 
Acute poverty can be transitory indeed. More than half of all bouts of poverty 
last four months or less.124 Almost four out of five bouts have ended within  
a year.125 
Of course, not all people who become acutely poor will do so with the same 
frequency or for the same periods of time. In addition to being much less likely to 
experience poverty in their first ten years of life, white children who do become 
poor are far more likely than children of color to experience no more than three 
years of poverty during that time.126 Among those in poverty, a far higher 
proportion of whites are acutely poor relative to African-Americans.127 More 
broadly, the acutely poor’s characteristics are far more like those of the  
general population.128 
Research comparing those below the poverty line for at least two months 
during the boom years of 1996 to 1999 with those that were poor for all months 
during those years is instructive. The former group was predominately the acute; 
the latter were solely the chronic poor.129 Among the total group, the poverty rate 
 
121. ASHLEY N. EDWARDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70-137, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC 
WELL-BEING: POVERTY, 2009–2011 (2014). 
122. The official estimate of persons living in poverty each year is derived from the Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, which collects only annual data. See DENAVAS-WALT  
& PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, supra note 115, at 1. To determine 
how many were poor for shorter periods, the Census Bureau relied on its Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), which returns to the same families for updates each month. See id. The 
difference between the two surveys accounts for the modest differences in estimates of the number of 
people living in annual poverty. 
123. EDWARDS, supra note 121. 
124. Jäntti, supra note 114, at 185 fig.7.1. 
125. Id. 
126. William H. Scarborough, Who Are the Poor? A Demographic Perspective, in CHILD 
POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 fig.3.4 ( Judith A. Chafel ed., 1993). 
127. GREG J. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 48–52 (1984). 
128. Id. at 48–49. 
129. Some 19.5% of the total population was poor for at least two months during those four 
years; only 2.0% were poor for all of those months. Thus, the latter group was barely one-tenth of the 
former. Jäntti, supra note 114, at 183 tbl.7.2. To be sure, a substantial number of the chronic poor have 
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among people of color was about two-and-a-half times that of non-Hispanic whites, 
but more than five times as many African-Americans and Latinos/Latinas were 
chronically poor.130 The rate at which suburbanites experienced acute poverty was 
modestly lower than the national average, while the rate at which they experienced 
chronic poverty was just over half of the overall average.131 Working age people 
experience acute poverty at a rate close to the national average but are much less 
likely to experience chronic poverty.132 Married couples experience about two-third 
the national rate of acute poverty but less than one-third the rate of acute poverty.133 
B. The Causes and Nature of Acute Poverty 
The federal poverty level today is derived from a measure of the cost of food 
half a century ago and adjusted for inflation. It has long been subject to harsh 
criticism, including from the Census Bureau itself, for inadequately measuring the 
extent of hardship experienced by financially pressed families.134 A major study by 
the National Academy of Sciences urged that the measure take into account both 
non-cash benefits, such as federal food and housing assistance, and the actual 
expenses low-income households are likely to face.135 Applying this same 
principle—that poverty is the result of a mismatch between practically inescapable 
expenses and household income—would suggest that families with incomes well 
above the poverty line that suffer unusually heavy expenses should be considered 
poor. Thus, those facing sudden, expensive medical crises or the need to replace a 
vehicle depended upon to commute to work and obtain basic necessities might be 
acutely poor. For the most part, however, anti-poverty programs make little 
allowance for the effects of such expenses on claimants’ ability to afford the  
basic necessities. 
On the other hand, those with substantial assets may not experience hardship 
during gaps in their incomes, even if their expenses rise. Donald Trump, for 
example, is showing no distress despite his sharply negative cash flow as he runs for 
president. Anti-poverty programs generally take one of two extreme approaches to 
assets: either ignoring them altogether for administrative simplicity or disqualifying 
claimants completely based on possession of relatively paltry levels of assets. 
Even defining poverty solely as a shortage of income, however, a very large 
number of otherwise middle-income families experience bouts of acute poverty 
 
an occasional month above the poverty line and would not be in the latter group, but the acute poor 






134. See, e.g., KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-251, THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
POVERTY MEASURE: 2013, at 1 (2014); DUNCAN, supra note 127, at 36–37. 
135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH (Constance  
F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., National Academy Press 1995). 
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during the course of a year, with many more doing so at least once within a span of 
a few years. And many of these families lack the assets to tide them over without 
material hardship and loss of security.136 
1. Triggers of Acute Poverty 
Individuals and families fall into acute poverty for a wide range of reasons, 
from the highly specific to the broadly systemic. The cause of a bout of poverty 
often has a significant effect on how policymakers and the general public view it 
and on the availability of anti-poverty programs to ease the hardship. 
a. Mass Disasters 
The most visible cause of acute poverty is a mass disaster. This could be a 
major natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, massive regional flooding, or a 
powerful earthquake. It also could be an economic disaster, typically a recession. 
The coronavirus pandemic is simultaneously an extreme mass casualty event with 
staggering direct costs and an extreme economic downturn. And, in the future, we 
may expect to see more environmental disasters, such as the BP oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico or various effects of climate change. These events disrupt economic 
activity over a wide area, destroying the means of production or forcing workers to 
relocate away from it. 
Initially, the public tends to feel strong empathy for disaster victims. Fairly 
rapidly, however, the public’s attention wanders off. Indeed, before very long the 
once-fawning news media starts to run stories casting the acute poor in a bad  
light: looters in disaster areas (who almost always turn out not to be from the 
affected area), homeowners or farmers facing dispossession who had vastly  
over-extended themselves financially, discouraged workers no longer seeking 
employment, and the like. The public then becomes impatient with the acute poor 
for not getting back on their feet more expeditiously. As the old political cartoon 
says, 8% unemployment is acceptable to 92% of workers. 
b. Localized Disasters 
Many natural disasters too small to garner national attention nonetheless can 
do considerable damage in a local area. Even if tornados have far less destructive 
power than hurricanes, if they knock out major local employers, they can still cause 
a sharp rise in acute poverty among the displaced workers and those that depend 
on them. When those workers stop spending, local retailers and service providers 
lay off their own employees, compounding the problem. Floods that destroy 
housing may force their residents to move away from their jobs for long enough to 
lose them. 
 
136. Jäntti, supra note 114, at 181. 
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Similarly, even when the national economy seems to be doing quite well, 
particular employers may encounter financial problems and have to close or shed 
workers. Others may merge with competitors and lay off newly redundant workers 
or move to other parts of the country or overseas. Where the employer dominates 
a particular community’s labor market, the result may be chronic poverty until a 
replacement employer arrives or enough laid-off workers move to other areas. But 
even in areas with more robust employment markets, several months of poverty 
may result before the worker gets re-employed. 
Here, too, disasters can beget more disasters. The Great Recession was caused 
by problems in the housing market but then exacerbated those problems as laid-off 
workers were unable to keep up payments on their mortgages. At the time, 
conventional wisdom was that the nation had a glut of housing, with property values 
dropping precipitously as a huge bubble deflated. With so many homes becoming 
vacant at a time when few families had the financial latitude to buy, foreclosing 
lenders needed to convert that housing to rentals quickly to prevent its decay. In 
many parts of the country with high rates of foreclosures, lenders failed to rise to 
that challenge and allowed much of their foreclosed inventory to fall out of the 
housing market. Increasing household formation with the recovering economy and 
natural population growth has outstripped new construction and the return of 
foreclosed houses to the market. As a result, a number of areas now have sharply 
rising rents for low- and modest-cost housing.137 
c. Individual Causes 
Although major, attention-grabbing social disasters cause considerable acute 
poverty, by far, the majority of instances have much more individualistic causes. 
Illnesses and injuries temporarily prevent people from working. Family members’ 
illnesses or injuries, or the disappearance or incapacitation of other caregivers, force 
workers to leave jobs. So do collapses in childcare arrangements or breakdowns of 
vehicles or carpools relied upon to get to work. Workers are fired or laid off and 
are part of the large and growing segment of the jobless that the unemployment 
compensation system does not cover. 
Domestic violence can often cause acute poverty.138 Whether a  
violence-driven break-up leaves the family in chronic poverty—or results in a cycle 
of reunions and splits with repeated episodes of acute poverty—often depends on 
the availability of supports for the survivor.139 That being said, although politicians 
and social scientists emphasize family break-ups as a cause of poverty, data suggests 
 
137. ALLISON CHARETTE ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES  
& ENTER. CMTY. PARTNERS, PROJECTING TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED  
RENTERS: 2015–2025 (2015). 
138. See Christine C. George, Welfare Reform and the Safety Needs of Battered Women, in THE 
PROMISE OF WELFARE REFORM: POLITICAL RHETORIC AND THE REALITY OF POVERTY IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 193, 193–95 (Keith M. Kilty & Elizabeth A. Segal eds., 2006). 
139. Id. at 195–98. 
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that some families composed of adults with limited skills would have been poor 
even had they stayed together.140 
Involvements with the criminal justice system or immigration enforcement 
may cause a worker to be incarcerated long enough to lose employment, even if the 
ultimate resolution is favorable. The stigma of having been locked up also can 
complicate finding replacement employment or force the worker to take a job 
paying less than she or he was accustomed to making. Relatives of someone arrested 
may see their finances disrupted when they post bail, contract on abusive terms 
with a private bail-bond company to do so,141 or travel to distant facilities for visits. 
Family financial crises can start a self-reinforcing downward spiral. When the 
sudden need to repair a home, or to pay a medical debt, strains the family’s 
resources, it may be unable to pay timely for childcare or routine car repair, causing 
a sudden inability to attend work. Family financial crises also can result in evictions, 
absorb a worker’s attention and possibly land the family much farther from her or 
his job. When a shock to the family’s finances results in a utility shut-off, the worker 
may be unable to maintain the personal appearance her or his employer demands. 
2. How the Acute Poor Are Different 
The acute poor are a large and diverse group—as, indeed, are the chronic poor. 
Identifying systematic differences between the two groups therefore is inherently 
problematic. Nonetheless, the acute poor are more likely to have certain 
characteristics than are the chronic poor. These characteristics may have important 
policy consequences for the design and administration of anti-poverty programs. 
These differences also, as discussed below, have important  
political consequences.142 
First, the circumstances of the acute poor are likely to be more volatile. They 
have already suffered a change for the worse; many are likely to be able to reverse 
that misfortune relatively soon while others may slip further into poverty. This 
volatility makes determinations of need based on information from earlier periods 
highly problematic: the challenges they are suffering today may not have begun to 
manifest then, and by the time some programs register their current hardships they 
may no longer need aid. 
Second, they are likely to have far less experience coping both with poverty 
and with the bureaucracy administering government aid programs than the chronic 
poor. This inexperience, or excessive optimism about the speed with which they 
will return to relative prosperity, may cause them to make serious mistakes 
compounding their problems, such as failing to curtail spending sufficiently rapidly 
 
140. Mary Jo Bane, Politics and Policies of the Feminization of Poverty, in THE POLITICS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 381, 384 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988). 
141. See Shaila Dewan, Court by Court, Lawyers Fight Policies That Fall Heavily on the Poor, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/us/court-by-court-lawyers-fight-
practices-that-punish-the-poor.html [https://perma.cc/G36U-NBHM].
142. See infra Section I.D. 
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or paying bills that are not tied to basic necessities. Administrative processes, too, 
that largely work for the chronic poor—not because those processes are clear but 
just because they are familiar—may lead to high rates of procedural denials when 
applied to the acute poor. 
Third, income-based measures of need may produce less precise measures of 
their circumstances. The chronic poor are likely to have long-ago exhausted reserves 
of spare food and wearable clothing, as well as the patience of creditors and the 
generosity of friends and family. For them, income directly determines what they 
may consume. Acutely poor individuals may be in a similar position—or may have 
significant reserves left to tap. Similarly, the acute poor may be contractually 
committed to relatively high monthly expenses—mortgage and car payments, 
cellphone and cable contracts, credit card debt, etc.—that sharply restrict the share 
of their incomes that are genuinely disposable while doing little to ameliorate  
their hardship. 
Fourth, they commonly are spending substantial amounts of their time seeking 
both to ameliorate their conditions and to regain the level of income they previously 
enjoyed. Researching possible jobs, applying, and interviewing can consume a great 
deal of time and reduce their scheduling flexibility. 
Fifth, the acute poor may resemble the non-poor more than they do the 
chronic poor both socially and vocationally. They are less likely to live in areas of 
concentrated poverty, they are more likely to have friends and close relatives living 
well above the poverty line, and they are more likely to have strong connections to 
the labor force. Of those poor for at least two months during 2009–2011, 53% were 
non-Hispanic whites compared with just 43% for the annual poor.143 Some 62% of 
the two-month poor were of working age compared with 57% of the annually poor. 
The acute poor appear to be significantly better educated: when more of the acute 
poor are included, 34% have attended at least one year of college compared with 
just 25% of the annual poor. The broader group is somewhat more likely to be male, 
to live in a metropolitan area, and to have no disabilities affecting their ability to 
work. Some 27% of the larger group are married compared with 19% of the annual 
poor. And 47% of the larger group are employed (with 23% working full-time) 
compared with less than half as many among the annual poor. Other studies have 
confirmed that the chronic poor are more likely to be non-white, to have a head of 
household with a disability and without a high school diploma, and to live in a 
female-headed family with children.144 
Finally, the acute poor commonly do not know when or whether they will 
return to their former circumstances. Many of the chronic poor, by contrast, assume 
that their circumstances will not improve significantly in the foreseeable future and 
tend to plan accordingly. The acute poor’s uncertainty about their prospects can 
cause them to make important mistakes, compounding their hardship. If they 
 
143. EDWARDS, supra note 121, at 21 tbl.A-4, 19 tbl.A-2. 
144. Kimberlin & Berrick, supra note 117, at 144–50. 
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believe their poverty will be brief, they may take on large amounts of debt to tide 
themselves over. Should their optimism prove unfounded, they will face heavy debt 
service payments and a declining credit rating, which may adversely affect their 
ability to secure employment. Similarly, if they lean heavily on friends and family in 
the beginning, they may alienate and lose those resources should their hardship last 
longer than expected. If, however, they assume their reverse will be protracted, they 
may seek to “cut their losses” by giving up on homes in which they have substantial 
equity, suffering severe losses. Overestimating the severity of their predicament also 
could cause them to seize a low-paying position and lock themselves into a lower 
long-term earnings path. 
C. The Consequences of Acute Poverty 
Although much has been written about the many and severe harms resulting 
from grinding chronic poverty, the harms of acute poverty have been far less 
carefully studied. To the extent the acute poor are considered at all, they are 
imagined to be a milder form of those suffered by the chronic poor. Some of the 
consequences of acute poverty do indeed resemble those that the chronic poor 
experience, although they are not necessarily distinguishable as milder. Others are 
distinctive results of the rapid fall from a different socioeconomic position. 
The broader social harms of geographically concentrated chronic policy also 
are widely recognized. Temporal concentrations of acute poverty also can cause 
serious damage to important public policies. 
1. Individualized Harms 
Anyone with humanitarian concerns about the effects of poverty should care 
deeply about the acutely poor. Although its duration may make it appear far less 
harmful than chronic poverty, being thrust into poverty and powerlessness is a 
wrenching, traumatic experience likely to cause harm persisting long after the 
episode has passed. 
a. Economic Waste 
Sudden descents into poverty are likely to cause significant economic waste. 
Thus, the actual hardship resulting from an individual or family’s fall into poverty 
may be inadequately captured by the drop in income. Acute poverty can convert the 
life of an individual or family into one large fire sale. 
Most items that the family might own—its home, motor vehicles, clothes, and 
other household goods—will sell for only a fraction of what they cost the 
household. The same is true of small businesses lost in a recession or natural disaster 
and of vehicles and other items household members ordinarily rely upon to make a 
living. Moreover, large amounts of personal property commonly are lost or 
damaged when a family is evicted or must move hurriedly. Acute poverty also can 
temporarily drive up the value of an individual’s time as she or he desperately seeks 
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the means to eat and to stave off eviction or utility shut-offs; this can drive choices 
that sacrifice long-term well-being, such as dropping out of training programs or 
missing time at a job that values attendance as a criteria for promotion. Finally, the 
acute poor may feel obliged to seek credit, which is commonly offered to them at 
effective interest rates that all but assure large debt service payments that squeeze 
out basic needs while failing to prevent the ultimate repossession of  
its collateral. 
As a result, a family that spends most of its time at twice the poverty line but 
suffers occasional periods at half of the poverty line may have trouble maintaining 
the array of personal property that a stable near-poor family living can. Even 
without any redistribution across the income spectrum, a system that taxed such a 
family while it was in its usual, relatively solvent, condition to pay for benefits to 
cushion its fall during the periods of deprivation would enhance its  
welfare dramatically. 
b. Physical Harms 
A large body of research finds that patients forced to pay substantial  
out-of-pocket costs for health care make bad choices, particularly in times of 
economic distress. Although patients naturally have strong incentives to make 
sound choices on going to the doctor, purchasing medications, and the like, they 
lack both the knowledge and the emotional distance to do so correctly. Thus, when 
a family falls into acute poverty, its attempts to trim costs by foregoing prescribed 
medications or to reduce their dose below therapeutic levels may result in disastrous 
effects on their health. The false savings of, for example, halving anti-hypertensive 
or anti-seizure medications may result in both reduced health status for the 
individual and in far more expensive hospitalizations for the health care system. 
Similarly, the reticence of the uninsured to seek testing and treatment for the 
coronavirus has exacerbated the pandemic.145 The same factors that can trigger 
bouts of acute poverty, such as pregnancy or illness, can render an individual more 
sensitive to the effects of a lack of basic necessities (as well as stress).146 
Other cost-savings that desperate acute poor individuals and families may seek 
can be similarly shortsighted. Attempts to save on public transit or taxi fares by 
walking at night through dangerous areas can result in muggings. Saving money on 
smoke or carbon monoxide detectors or furnace maintenance causes numerous 
deaths each year. Families suddenly forced to find less expensive childcare 
arrangements before they have sufficient time to investigate the low-cost providers 
may rue the day. 
 
145. See Mark Kreidler, We’re Just Starting to See the Devastating Impact that COVID-19 Will 
Have on Poor Americans, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90484562/ 
were-just-starting-to-see-the-devastating-impact-that-covid-19-will-have-on-poor-americans [https:// 
perma.cc/U6VQ-DN6B]. 
146. Kimberlin & Berrick, supra note 117, at 152. 
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c. Psychological Harms 
Falling into acute poverty, even for short periods of time, can cause severe 
psychological trauma, destroying the sense of security that is important for the  
well-being of adults and children alike. Parents’ relationships with their children can 
suffer lasting damage. Having to go to school unbathed or in ill-fitting, worn-out, 
or dirty clothes can alienate a child from her or his peers on a lasting basis. And 
being unable to provide the basic necessities for children can humiliate and depress 
parents. The sense of powerlessness resulting from sudden destitution can lead to 
depression and listlessness. And the increased financial stress breaks up numerous 
marriages. Although studies have shown greater impacts of children’s psychological 
and intellectual development from chronic poverty, they have found significant 
effects for acute poverty as well.147 
2. Undermining Public Policy 
Quite apart from its individual effects, acute poverty so severely threatens 
important public policies that our current, lackadaisical response to it is quite 
surprising. That indifference is certainly shortsighted. 
a. Increasing Chronic Poverty 
Episodes of acute poverty pose a serious if underappreciated risk of 
undermining public policies aimed at eradicating chronic poverty. The hardships of 
acute poverty can increase the risk that a family will fall into chronic poverty. This 
can happen in several ways. The reverse can demoralize the family, resulting in 
decreased efforts to find employment and depressed performances in job 
interviews. It can cause couples to split up, increasing all family members’ chances 
of falling into chronic poverty. The loss of income can cause the family to fall 
behind on its bills, harming its credit rating. With increasing numbers of employers 
checking credit reports of job applicants, this can harm the family’s  
long-term prospects. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, the harms associated with acute poverty may be 
sufficiently severe to cause some low-skilled people to prefer chronic poverty. In 
their landmark study of the choices that low-skilled single mothers make, Kathryn 
Edin and Laura Lein found that many of those staying on welfare rather than 
seeking employment did so because they despaired of social programs’ treatment of 
the acute poor. They reported that, once laid off from a job, it would take several 
months to reinstate their cash assistance and food stamps, during which time they 
and their children would face extreme hardship.148 Being realistic about the limits 
of the job market’s demand for their skills, they concluded that they had little hope 
of leaving poverty completely; their only real choice was between chronic poverty 
 
147. Id. at 152–53. 
148. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 55, at 68–69. 
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and a still austere existence modestly above the poverty line punctuated by periods 
of acute poverty. Because they believed that the severity of the hardships during 
those bouts of acute poverty would be more severe than the effects of chronic 
poverty, they chose the latter.149 
b. Damaging the Macroeconomy 
Acute poverty can cause serious consequences for the national economy. 
People suddenly having their incomes plummet are likely to radically cut back on 
their spending. If replicated across a large number of individuals and families, this 
can significantly reduce aggregate demand. Depressed demand is likely to cause 
businesses to trim their labor forces to match diminished revenues. Those 
reductions in employment, in turn, are likely to plunge more people into acute 
poverty, reinforcing the destructive cycle. This is the classic problem in 
macroeconomic policy that John Maynard Keynes and others sought to address 
during the Great Depression and that their followers have highlighted ever since. 
Partially in response to Keynesian economics, anti-poverty programs such as 
UC and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food 
stamps) seek to aid the acute poor, stabilize aggregate demand, and cushion 
economic slumps. As discussed below, however, these programs are sharply limited 
in their effectiveness in aiding the acute poor and stabilizing a depressed economy. 
Although all low-income people face intense pressure to limit their spending, 
the acute poor’s hardships are particularly likely to threaten macroeconomic health 
for two reasons. First, because they had been spending more prior to the reverses 
they suffered, their vendors and the economy as a whole will have been counting 
on those funds. 
Second, their prior prosperity was likely to induce lenders to offer, and them 
to accept, more credit than the chronic poor receive. By contrast, many of the 
chronic poor’s creditors are involuntary ones—unpaid landlords, utility companies, 
and the like—who likely budgeted for a certain rate of default when they went into 
that line of business. The acute poor often will be at risk of defaulting on the same 
kinds of debt but may have other, more extensive, debts. If they prioritize those 
obligations, their actual purchases of goods and services may decline by a higher 
percentage than their incomes do, accelerating the deflationary effects on the overall 
economy. This sort of debt deflation, characterized by too many people trying to 
pay down debt while too few have the courage to increase their leverage, was a 
major factor in the Great Depression and has been an important contributor to the 
three most recent U.S. recessions and seems likely to be so again in the  
coronavirus recession. 
The macroeconomic effects of acute poverty are likely to be greater for victims 
of mass disasters because larger numbers will be reducing their spending at once. 
 
149.  Id. at 68-69. 
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Even those becoming acutely poor for local or individualized reasons, however, can 
contribute to the drag on an already weak economy. 
D. The Politics of Acute Poverty 
The politics of chronic poverty in the United States are exceedingly complex. 
Many supporters of the chronic poor have strong ulterior motives;150 the same is 
also true of many of their critics.151 The electorate is hostile to most existing  
anti-poverty programs yet also overwhelmingly says we should do more for the 
poor, even if doing so would require raising taxes.152 Although some have tried to 
fit low-income people into one of the major partisan coalitions, this has proved 
disastrous for several reasons. 153 Low-income people lack the clear identity and 
effective means of communication required to wield political influence, and the 
numbers of votes that politicians can gain by attacking the chronic poor commonly 
exceeds the number won by helping them. The chronic poor have fared best when 
a handful of politicians from across the ideological spectrum have come to see their 
needs as moral imperatives and acted together quietly.154 
The politics of acute poverty are quite different, but also complicated. At their 
heart is a striking paradox: policymakers, advocates, and scholars across the political 
spectrum valorize the acute poor, yet all permit their overwhelming focus on the 
chronic poor to lead them to embrace policies that compound the woes of the acute 
poor. This arguably is a consequence of the strong desire to maintain discipline 
among recipients of public benefits—a desire largely motivated by concerns about 
the chronic poor.155 
1. Aspirational Politics 
Across the ideological spectrum, politicians deem the acute poor to be far 
more palatable than the chronic poor. Indeed, the acute poor often seem to typify 
many policymakers’ notion of the “worthy poor.” Part of this clearly can be traced 
 
150. The Hudson Institute’s Christopher DeMuth notes that a large proportion of anti-poverty 
spending does not go directly to low-income people, but rather to more affluent service providers, such 
as doctors, nursing homes, and social workers. FEDERALIST SOC’Y, Comment in The Safety Net  
& Poverty [Panel],  YOUTUBE (Feb. 27, 2016),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcV-DC1CIXo 
[https://perma.cc/NZ3U-VDAM]. 
151. See, e.g., KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 54, at 278–80 (seeing 
criticism of anti-poverty programs as an excuse to cut taxes on the affluent). 
152. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS 
OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 27–30 (1999); LESLIE MCCALL, THE UNDESERVING RICH: AMERICAN 
BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND REDISTRIBUTION 193–209 (2013). 
153. See Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, supra note 111. 
154. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure 
of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) [hereinafter Super, Laboratories of Destitution ] 
(contrasting failed high-profile partisan efforts to liberalize welfare rules with low-profile bipartisan 
success in expanding in-kind benefit programs and those for the elderly and people with disabilities); 
Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, supra note 111. 
155. See infra Section II.A. 
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to the acute poor’s greater social and cultural resemblance to the middle-class. As 
noted above, the acute poor are whiter, better educated, and better connected to 
the workforce than the chronic poor.156 And in our segregated society, more  
middle-class people likely know someone who has experienced acute poverty than 
someone who is or was chronically poor. 
Some of the affinity for the acute poor also may well be fiscal: although 
providing four years of aid to one person costs no more than providing one year of 
aid to four people, the former may feel like a more open-ended, uncontrollable 
commitment. Acute poverty may seem like a fleeting aberration, a quickly 
remediable mistake (never mind that that “mistake” keeps recurring); chronic 
poverty is far more commonly viewed as something deliberately deviant. The 
misperception that acute poverty is far less costly to address than chronic poverty 
is a two-edged sword, as it encourages arguments that the private sector, or local 
governments with very modest tax bases, can provide what is needed. 
In addition, human nature tends to be far more communitarian during acute 
crises such as natural disasters. Aid to the chronic poor can appeal to 
redistributionists, of which this country has relatively few; aid to the acute poor is 
much more about humanitarianism. As noted above, the obvious economic waste 
commonly resulting from acute poverty is obviously offensive to seemingly 
apolitical preferences for economic efficiency.157 Sometimes, public concern for the 
acute poor redounds to the benefit of the chronic poor. Michelle Landis Dauber 
shows that many concepts in the New Deal were consciously derived from this 
nation’s history of relieving acute poverty brought on by natural disasters.158 The 
New Deal, in turn, used the economic disaster of the Great Depression, and 
attendant sympathy for the acute poor, to win enactment of programs that aided 
large categories of the chronic poor. 
Valorization of the acute poor has been a persistent theme in welfare policy 
debates since the late 1980s. Candidates for high office brag about having overcome 
early bouts of acute poverty as a demonstration of their strong character.159 
Polemically, this takes the form of slogans demanding that benefit programs 
provide “a trampoline, not a hammock.”160 Analytically, this took the form of 
 
156. See supra Section II.B.2. 
157. See supra Section II.C.1.a. 
158. Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating the 
American Welfare State, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257 (1999); see also Michele L. Landis, “Let Me Next 
Time Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 
NW. U. L. REV. 967 (1998). 
159. See, e.g., CARLY FIORINA, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: MY LEADERSHIP JOURNEY 
(2015); Ashley Parker, Republican Candidates, Minus Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, Play Nice at Poverty 
Forum, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/us/politics/republican-
candidates-minus-donald-trump-and-ted-cruz-play-nice-at-poverty-forum.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F6JS-PSKV]. 
 160AP Wire Serv., Gov. Walker Signs 9 Bills Limiting Welfare: ‘More like a Trampoline; Less like a 
Hammock,’ FOX6NOW.COM (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://fox6now.com/2018/04/10/gov-scott-
walker-to-sign-9-welfare-overhaul-bills-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/CZ85-CF9R]. 
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debates about the length of spells of assistance. The 1996 welfare law was presaged 
by a debate over the size of the acute poor, with both sides assuming that they were 
more virtuous. Opponents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
focused on the long average duration of aid receipt by those on the program at any 
given time, suggesting that the program was dominated by the chronic poor. 
AFDC’s supporters, in turn, focused on the short average duration of aid of those 
entering (or leaving) the program, focusing on AFDC’s importance to the acute 
poor.161 A similar, if less prominent, debate proceeded with respect to food stamps, 
with both sides assuming that serving a greater faction of acutely poor people made 
the program more desirable. 
Programmatically, enthusiasm for the acute poor led to the establishment of, 
and long-time bipartisan support for, the UC system.162 More generally, when the 
Great Depression introduced acute poverty to a huge number of middle-income 
people who had previously regarded themselves as very different from the chronic 
poor, we saw a dramatic expansion of federal and state intervention against poverty 
generally. National health care reform, which had long been on some progressives’ 
political agenda but never came close to enactment, was helped over the threshold 
by the surge in acute poverty generated by the Great Recession. Although the 
eventual entrenchment of the Affordable Care Act is likely to lead to broader shifts 
in social insurance policy,163 to date the dominant model of aid to the acute poor 
has been built around individual, highly discretionary charity rather than  
systematic programming. 
2. Practical Politics 
Despite politicians’ public embrace of the acute poor, the reality is increasingly 
different. When forces supportive of, and hostile to, the chronic poor do battle, the 
acute poor are all too often collateral casualties. The charitable model allows all sides 
in battles over the chronic poor to view the acute poor as not raising significant 
public policy issues. And because the acute poor are little considered and even less 
well understood, they often bear the brunt of rhetoric and policies intended to 
discipline the chronic poor. 
a. Inability to Leverage Power Politics 
Without effective access to conventional power politics, expansions of  
anti-poverty programs typically require a long time to build up support for a change, 
 
161. MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO 
REFORM 28–40 (1994). 
162. Even Charles Murray, who achieved widespread attention for demanding the wholesale 
elimination of anti-poverty programs, found UC acceptable. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING  
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 230 (1984). 
163. David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and 
Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873 (2014) [hereinafter Super, Modernization of American 
Public Law ]. 
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building public awareness, recruiting political leaders whose primary attention is 
directed elsewhere, crafting and refining legislation, and wearing down the political 
system’s inertia. This kind of time is not available for that segment of the acutely 
poor that suffers a simultaneous crisis, such as a natural disaster or an economic 
downturn. To be sure, a high-profile mass calamity may accelerate the public’s 
awareness of the problem, but the mobilization of the political process—in 
particular, recruiting leaders and getting them up to speed—is still a lengthy process. 
The fact that the highly publicized mass suffering Hurricane Katrina did not 
produce a single permanent change to any major assistance program,164 and that 
extensions of UC benefits legislated during recessions are invariably subject to 
arbitrary time limits165 (rather than made contingent on economic conditions)166 is 
further testament to the political process’s grudging response to the acute poor and 
the defensiveness of even their supporters. Little evidence so far has emerged that 
the coronavirus recession will be any different: despite a massive public health 
problem, not a single state so far seems to be seriously considering expanding 
Medicaid to childless adults and parents with incomes between the state’s historical 
public assistance grant levels and 138% of the poverty line. 
The acute poor are even less likely than the chronic poor to have power within 
the political system.167 They tend to be geographically diffuse. And their self-identity 
as low-income people is likely to be even thinner than that of the chronic poor, 
particularly after the episode of poverty passes. Although some former members of 
the acute poor may return to the ranks of middle-income people with greater 
sympathy for anti-poverty programs,168 many find the experience so traumatic that 
they wish to distance themselves from it as much as possible. This is particularly 
true because, as discussed below, our current programs often fail to provide timely, 
meaningful assistance to the acutely poor. Although some social scientists suggest 
replacing the “poor/non-poor” dichotomy in our thinking with a range from 
“persistent poverty” through “transitory poverty” and “economic vulnerability” to 
“financial security,”169 asking people to admit even to being vulnerable requires a 
severe hit to their self-esteem---all the more so in a society whose response to 
chronic poverty includes shaming of economic adversity. Thus, the exigencies of 
their condition prevent them from being politically active during their periods of 
 
164. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375 (2011) (describing 
failure to enact timely legislation in response to the mass devastation of Hurricane Katrina). 
165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1400v (2018) (providing UC benefits with a fixed national 
termination date). 
166. See CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS REMAIN CRITICAL FOR THE ECONOMY 1 
(2010), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-10-10ui.pdf  [https://perma.cc/
HQE5-TK44] (noting the impending cessation of extended UC despite unemployment well above 9%). 
167. See Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, supra note 111 (explaining why power politics 
has proven inferior to humanitarian appeals in U.S. anti-poverty politics). 
168. See Duncan et al., supra note 113, at 88 (suggesting that possibility). 
169. Id. 
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acute distress and denial of their vulnerability makes efforts to secure a more robust 
safety net unlikely when their situation improves. 
The recent rise in protectionist populism in both major political parties 
suggests another possible route to gaining attention for the acute poor within the 
realm of power politics. Even if broader trade improves efficiency and hence total 
economic well-being, it inevitably yields major losers in industries vulnerable to 
competition from imports. Cushioning the blow for those rendered acutely poor by 
layoffs and plant closings would be wise for free trade advocates. To date, however, 
their interest in anti-poverty programs has been limited to SNAP, and even then, 
only as a way of diverting money from trade-distorting farm subsidy programs.170 
This does not preclude appeals to empathy and public ethics, but that, too, 
faces practical obstacles. Critics of low-income people and programs that serve 
them have achieved enormous success in painting the chronic poor as the only 
image of low-income people generally. Anti-poverty groups for the most part have 
accepted this characterization and seen fit to do battle on the ground chosen by 
their foes. 
b. The Limited Efficacy of Litigation for the Acute Poor 
Nor have the acute poor fared well in less conventional forms of political 
struggle. Litigation, which played a symbiotic role with anti-poverty political 
advocacy prior to 1995,171 obtained little traction on behalf of the acute poor. Such 
cases were procedurally difficult to sustain, with many potential plaintiffs becoming 
moot before complaints could be filed and others struggling to ward off dismissals 
for mootness.172 These factors made systemic unemployment compensation cases 
relatively unusual.173 Even in a period when it was interpreting welfare law 
generously for chronically poor recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC),174 the Supreme Court responded harshly in Quern v. Mandley to 
acutely poor claimants’ attempt to regularize AFDC’s Emergency Assistance (EA) 
component.175 Hewing closely to the charity-inspired discretionary model rather 
than the legalistic approach it had taken to the chronic poor, the Court announced 
a sweeping principle of deference to states’ judgments. Although the Court later 
 
170. David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in 
the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1370–77 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Quiet 
“Welfare” Revolution ] (describing the successful efforts of pro-trade Republicans, including President 
Bush, to shift money from agricultural programs to SNAP in the 2002 Farm Bill). 
171. David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual 
Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2005). 
172. But see Hess v. Hughes, 500 F. Supp. 1054, 1057–58 (D. Md. 1980) (rejecting such  
an argument). 
173. See Esparza v. Valdez, 862 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1988) (dismissing UC suit for mootness). 
174. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodget, 421 U.S. 707 (1975) (striking down state restrictions on 
AFDC eligibility in a unanimous opinion by Justice Rehnquist). 
175. Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978). 
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backtracked somewhat in Blum v. Bacon,176 its failure to provide a clear basis for 
distinguishing between the two cases, and its obvious discomfort at legalizing the 
response to acute poverty, left legal services lawyers skeptical that additional such 
litigation was worth allocating limited resources to bring. 
c. Privatizing the Response to Acute Poverty 
The greater sympathy much of the public holds for the acute poor facilitates 
recruiting and energizing volunteers. With many in public life seeking to shift 
responsibility to private charities for as many human services needs as possible, 
charities often find themselves the primary source of aid to some low-income 
people. An example of the strength of this feeling may be seen in the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
which cut food stamps more than $27 billion over six years—almost entirely 
through across-the-board benefit reductions. It also, however, added $600 million 
over the same period to buy commodities for emergency food providers to 
distribute to hungry families in crisis, including those suffering from the food stamp 
cuts. The private-sector delivery mechanism, and the targeting on the acute poor, 
have made The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) immensely popular. 
Diffuse private charitable delivery mechanisms, however, also have the effect of 
concealing the extent of the problem. It is easy to assume that the kindhearted 
people running food pantries would never turn away a family in genuine need, 
ignoring the reality that they must do just that if need far outstrips the resources 
provided to them.177 
The for-profit sector also plays a larger part in responding to acute poverty 
than to chronic poverty. This has caused considerable alarm that these entities were 
siphoning off much of the little disposable income individuals and families have. In 
particular, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau initially recognized this and 
is, in effect, sought to limit payday and other sub-prime lenders to doing business 
with the acute poor, not the chronic poor. President Trump’s appointees since have 
reversed this policy.178 Even if it wanted to, the Bureau’s ability to achieve this result 
is far from clear, but even if it can, it is a relatively modest one: some developing 
countries combat acute poverty with state-sponsored low-interest lenders.179 
 
176. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982). 
177. See Janet Poppendieck, SWEET CHARITY? EMERGENCY FOOD AND THE END OF 
ENTITLEMENT (1998) (showing a vast mismatch between emergency food resources and need). 
178.    Nicholas Confessore & Stacy Cowley, Trump Appointees Manipulated Agency’s Payday 
Lending Research, Ex-Staffer Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/04/29/business/cfpb-payday-loans-rules.html [https://perma.cc/W7GP-ZGGE].  
179. See,  e.g.,  Description  of  “Tia  Rica”  Program,  GOBIERNO  DE  CHILE,  https:// 
www.dicrep.cl/la-institucion/historia/ [https://perma.cc/R7BH-EV79]. 
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d. Collateral Damage in Battles over the Chronic Poor 
Our obsession with the chronic poor clouds our thinking about the acute 
poor. To begin with, the popular trampoline metaphor is hardly apt: the acute poor 
often provide their own energy for escaping poverty and seek much the same sort 
of support as the chronic poor, just for a shorter time. But the notion that  
low-income people need to be forcibly launched toward greater self-sufficiency fits 
nicely with condescending narratives about low-income people generally and makes 
no distinction between those who raise their incomes of their own volition and 
those that the state must press to do so. 
Budget cutting fervor typically crescendos right after the trough of an 
economic cycle.180 At this point, the headline deficit numbers look frightening to 
the unsophisticated voter and claims that tax cuts will accelerate an anemic recovery 
find a receptive audience. To support these demands for austerity come attacks on 
recipients of public benefits as doing too little to help themselves. A large fraction 
of those recipients, however, are those suffering acute poverty because of  
the recession. 
Defenders of the chronic poor, too, often badly undermine the acute poor. To 
show their fiscal probity, they have largely eschewed seeking permanent legislation 
that would provide additional aid whenever specified indicators (such as the 
unemployment rate) exceeded certain thresholds, leaving the acute poor to hope 
Congress timely enacts new legislation for each crisis. They similarly seek to 
demonstrate probity by embracing draconian reporting, verification, and anti-fraud 
measures, which affect the naïve far more than the dishonest. If anything, these 
policies commonly target the acute poor with particular vigor because they look 
more like the non-poor (and hence ineligible) than the chronic poor do. 
More generally, in their efforts to assure skeptical voters and policymakers that 
the chronic poor receiving benefits from public programs are in fact the “truly 
needy,” the chronic poor’s supporters agreed to extremely rigorous eligibility 
requirements that denied participation to claimants whose situations offered any 
ambiguity at all. They thus sharpened the line between middle-income voters and 
destitute people in extreme need, denying aid to claimants with one foot in each of 
those two worlds. Because that is precisely the position of many of the acute poor, 
these rules denied aid to many of them. 
Although some changes in program rules have helped the acute poor, most of 
those were enacted primarily to benefit the stable near-poor instead. These changes 
include liberalization or elimination of resource limits, lifted income eligibility limits, 
and procedural simplifications such as self-attestation of income in Medicaid. 
Often, however, these reforms for the stable near-poor required substantial current 
earnings, excluding many of the acute poor. 
 
180. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005). 
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e. Active Hostility Toward the Acute Poor 
In recent years, critics of anti-poverty policies have made their attacks on the 
acute poor much more explicit.181 The Tea Party is widely regarded as having sprung 
up in response to a rant against aid to the acute poor in the mortgage crisis.182 
Despite the Great Recession’s obvious severity, critics insisting that it reflected a 
collective failure of the work ethic—effectively tarring the acute poor with the same 
“behavioral poverty” brush long wielded against aid to the chronic poor—received 
surprising prominence. As our politics become less and less able to grapple with 
institutional problems and more addicted to blame and scapegoating, this trend is 
likely to continue. 
These attacks have had real-world effects, hurting the chronic poor but often 
hurting the acute poor even more. North Carolina sharply reduced the number of 
weeks of UC available to laid-off workers even at the cost of reducing its receipt of 
federal funds. Arizona recently reduced its lifetime limit on aid under the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to twelve months. This is not even 
superficially adequate for the acute poor: during and after the Great Recession, 
Arizona’s unemployment rate exceeded 8% for almost four consecutive years—and 
exceeded 10% for nineteen consecutive months.183 At the behest of the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Secretary’s Innovation Group (SIG), 
Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, and Oklahoma enacted legislation 
prohibiting their human services departments from seeking routine waivers of 
SNAP’s three-month time limit on childless adults for areas with abnormally high 
unemployment and other states eligible for the continuation of such waivers 
declined to renew them. 
II. TYPES OF POLICIES THAT INCREASE HARDSHIP FOR THE ACUTE POOR 
Although public welfare law has been intensely controversial over the years, 
virtually all influential positions across the ideological spectrum in this country have 
shared several key assumptions. This consensus standard model of anti-poverty law 
is built around concerns about moral hazard: that providing aid to low-income 
 
181. See David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 2032 (2004) (describing the importance of moral critiques of low-income people in 
contemporary policymaking). 
182. Danny Vinik, CNBC’s Rick Santelli Was Embarrassed on Live TV for Being Wrong About 
the Economy. But He’s Hardly Alone, NEW REPUBLIC ( July 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/118693/steve-liesman-cuts-short-rick-santellis-cnbc-rant-about-inflation [https://perma.cc/
AK9Y-GGRR]. 
183. Unemployment in Arizona reached 8.2% in December 2008 and did not drop back below 
8% until October 2012 (and even then, remained within a few tenths of a percentage point of 8% for 
several additional months). Arizona’s unemployment rate was at least 10% from May 2009 through 
November 2010. Arizona’s Unemployment Statistics from January 2008 to December 2012,  
U.S. BUREAU L. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ ( last visited Apr. 21, 2020) (click “DATA TOOLS” from 
drop down menu; then, “Data Retrieval Tools;” then “Unemployment;” then click on “Data Finder” 
icon next to “Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS);” click Arizona Unemployment Rate 
hyperlink; select 2008 for the “Start Year” and 2012 for “End Year;” lastly, click “Update”). 
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people invites abuse in the form of claims from people who either are not in need 
or are in need because of their own moral failings. Liberals and conservatives often 
disagree about what constitutes need and what counts as a moral failing, and they 
may contest the resources that society should devote to aiding the poor, but they 
broadly agree that fighting moral hazard by restricting access to aid is one of the 
most important goals of program design.184 In essence, this model requires 
claimants to fall into, and demonstrate, destitution before receiving most forms of 
assistance with monthly subsistence costs.185 
Public benefit programs restrict access in a variety of ways. Some affect 
potential claimants’ propensity to apply; others are rules restricting which applicants 
may receive benefits. These rules may be divided between procedural and 
substantive requirements, both of which commonly exclude large numbers of 
people from major programs. Substantive rules, in turn, include both financial and 
non-financial eligibility requirements. Financial rules include income eligibility 
limits,186 which are administered with filing unit rules187 (i.e., rules about which 
other people’s income counts when a claimant seeks benefits) and budgeting (i.e., 
rules specifying the period for which income is relevant to eligibility).188 Some 
programs also base eligibility on the resources (assets) available to the claimant.189 
Non-financial rules often include categorical rules (e.g., limiting benefits to the 
elderly, or to persons with disabilities, or to families with children),190 conduct 
requirements,191 and sometimes waiting lists or other priority rules for distributing 
benefits if the program lacks the funding to serve all eligible people who apply and 
comply with all program procedures.192 
A great many policies restricting access to means-tested benefits affect the 
acute and chronic poor similarly. Categorical rules excluding childless adults or 
income eligibility limits, for example, simply narrow the kinds of needs the programs 
will recognize. They probably have roughly the same effect on acute and chronic 
poor claimants. 
Several restrictive policies, however, reduce the availability of aid to the acute 
poor substantially more than they do to the chronic poor. These underappreciated 
 
184. This is far less true in much of Europe, where corporatist and social democratic models 
predominate. See supra note 95. 
185. The model does not require destitution to receive certain services, such as health care, or 
for annual assistance through the tax code. 
186. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (2018) (setting income eligibility limits for SNAP). 
187. See, e.g., id. § 2012(m) (defining who must be included in the “household” unit for which 
claimants make SNAP applications). 
188. See, e.g., id. § 2014(f) (establishing two possible budgeting methods for SNAP). 
189. See, e.g., id. § 2014(g) (setting resource eligibility rules for SNAP). 
190. See, e.g., id. § 2015(o) (limiting many childless adults to three months of SNAP benefits 
every three years); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2018) (limiting TANF block grant funds to families with children); 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (limiting Medicaid categories existing prior to the Affordable Care Act). 
191. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d), (l) (imposing work and child support cooperation requirements 
in SNAP). 
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(4) (requiring WIC program to have such a priority system). 
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effects severely exacerbate the effects of acute poverty on individual low-income 
people and on society as a whole. This Part identifies several types of those policies. 
A. Deterrence Policies 
Deterrence policies seeking to raise the costs of participating above its 
expected benefits are a crucial part of how policymakers restrict the chronic poor’s 
participation in public benefit programs.193 The remainder of this Section discusses 
the ways in which eligibility policies disqualify the acute poor, intentionally or 
otherwise. Many of the policies seeking to deter participation, however, may have 
as great or greater impacts. Some research suggests that the acute poor often are in 
even worse financial shape when they apply for public benefits than the average 
chronic poor recipient. 
The stigma attached to receiving means-tested benefits is likely to afflict and 
deter the acute poor far more than the chronic poor for several reasons. First, the 
acute poor are likely to live in social circles where participation in these programs is 
much less common; being discovered buying food with SNAP or switching to a 
physician who accepts Medicaid therefore may seem more surprising and alienating. 
Second, acute poor people are likely to have had less experience with these 
programs and their stigma. Stigma’s effects are likely to decline over time. Those 
that have never received public benefits before may be particularly reluctant to cross 
that line, perhaps overestimating the shame they would feel from receiving aid or 
perhaps feeling pride in having never received such benefits. Even among those that 
have received public benefits previously, the longer one does so, the more specific 
embarrassing events—being seen by a friend entering a welfare office, being 
criticized by strangers for SNAP purchases, explaining to a doctor why one is 
changing to a Medicaid provider, sitting in a filthy waiting room, being asked 
personal questions in a cubicle with little privacy, etc.—they already will have 
experienced. Although these experiences take their toll on claimants’ morale, they 
also reduce the potential harm from further applications and participation. 
And third, the acute poor may face particular moral criticism for receiving 
benefits based on assumptions that they could have avoided needing the aid. 
The relative deterrence effects of paperwork requirements are more 
ambiguous. On the one hand, many of these policies’ attrition among eligible 
claimants results from limited literacy or numeracy. Because the acute poor as a 
group are better educated than the chronic poor, they presumably will be less 
frequently confused by obscurely written forms and notices. On the other hand, 
public benefit programs’ administrative apparatuses are notoriously inconsistent at 
even trying to explain themselves. The chronic poor may have much greater access 
to other sources of information about how the bureaucracy behaves and what it 
expects of them: their own prior experiences or those of their friends and relatives. 
 
193. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for 
Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Offering an Invisible Hand ]. 
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The absence of this bureaucratic experience may result in delays or denials of aid 
even for the most diligent and literate acute poor claimants. Some of the chronic 
poor are so exhausted and disorganized that they fail to meet important 
administrative deadlines; some of the acute poor may be so in shock from their 
sudden reversal, or so demoralized from the position in which they find themselves, 
that they, too, fail to meet such deadlines. 
B. Procedural Rules Failing to Accommodate the Acute Poor 
Unfortunately, many of the assumptions underlying anti-poverty programs are 
built upon images of the chronic poor. These assumptions often prove deeply 
flawed even when applied to the chronic poor but are even more so with respect to 
the acute poor. 
For example, the public welfare system commonly assumes that claimants are 
entirely idle, with unlimited time available for agencies to allocate as they see fit. 
The result is burdensome eligibility determination processes, featuring long waits 
and massive busywork, as well as grossly inefficient “welfare-to-work” and child 
support enforcement programs. These time-wasters frequently clash with the  
part-time jobs, parent-teacher conferences, caregiving responsibilities, medical 
appointments, and other agency involvements of chronically poor claimants. 
Acutely poor people are even more likely to have conflicting demands on their time, 
either seeking to resolve whatever barrier to employment cast them into poverty or 
looking for work directly. We should not be compelling acute poor people with 
extensive, often skilled, employment histories to choose between applying for jobs 
for which they are specially qualified and sitting in a “job club” making endless rote 
phone calls to employers of unskilled labor hoping that a vacancy has occurred in 
the three minutes since the last “job club” participant called.194 
In addition to assuming that claimants have unlimited time on any particular 
day, public benefit programs also tend to assume that claimants are in no particular 
hurry to find employment. Thus, long waiting lists for childcare assistance arouse 
little public attention or outrage. For the acute poor, who are mindful that every 
month they are out of work makes them look less desirable to prospective 
employers, these waiting lists are devastating. 
Public benefit programs also are remarkably unselfconscious about the 
complexity of the procedures claimants must navigate to secure benefits. Tests of 
the reading levels of application forms and program information materials routinely 
find them requiring college-level reading skills or above. Even new legal services 
attorneys are commonly baffled when attempting to help their clients complete 
these forms. Chronic poor claimants master the forms through a combination of 
trial and error and knowing people experienced in navigating the programmatic 
maze. Acute poor claimants, by contrast, are likely to err. At best, this will result in 
a denial that the claimants may mistake for a decision on the merits. At worst, honest 
 
194. Duncan et al., supra note 113, at 88. 
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errors may trigger fraud investigations by offices with quotas to meet, terrifying the 
claimant and anyone who knows her or him. 
C. Defective Measures of Financial Need 
Means tests in public benefit programs pursue a variety of often-inconsistent 
aims. Some focus solely on the income readily available to a claimant to meet one 
or a set of expenses. Others, however, seek to limit benefits to a subset of  
low-income people in a particular type of circumstances, often extreme destitution. 
Indeed, some eligibility restrictions originated at least in part in efforts to keep the 
acute poor out of programs. This seems to have reflected a profile of people in need 
that the acute poor did not meet because of their lingering similarities to the middle 
class. Rules requiring extreme destitution commonly hit the acute poor hard, 
allowing the chronic poor alone to qualify when their destitution becomes 
sufficiently extreme. 
For example, restrictions on the resources that recipients could own insist that 
claimants reach extreme destitution before sending public aid.195 In the case of 
liquid resources, this could be justified as demanding that the acute poor rely on 
their savings as their primary safety net, rather than public aid. Critics might 
challenge that demand by arguing that means-tested programs should be regarded 
as social insurance, with general tax payments being the premiums. This social 
insurance model, and the greater participation of the acute poor that it would yield, 
would enhance social cohesion as well as the political health of these programs 
relative to the dominant destitution model. But at least the demand that personal 
savings be acutely poor people’s first resort is a coherent allocation of public funds. 
Far more problematic are disqualifications for holding non-liquid resources. 
Nobody can eat their car, and a forced sale of one creates enormous financial waste. 
It also is likely to adversely affect the claimants’ ability to find and keep employment 
and cope with the chores of daily life such as buying food and getting children to 
school. The standard vision of the poor, which very much specifies the chronic 
poor, expects total destitution and does not consider employment-related needs. (It 
also is distinctly urban, not contemplating that the lack of a car could isolate a 
claimant from society and put the basic necessities out of reach.) Rules counting 
claimants’ homes as resources,196 or subjecting them to liens for the value of 
assistance paid,197 similarly insist on total degradation as a condition of receiving 
aid. They thus fit well into Piven and Cloward’s narrative of harsh public assistance 
programs seeking to sharpen lines between low-wage workers and the destitute as a 
means of disciplining those workers. 
 
195. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g)(1) (limiting resources SNAP participants may own). 
196. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i)(B)(5) (1996) (counting certain houses unless the family 
demonstrates an inability to sell). 
197. See Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (upholding such liens). 
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Rules disqualifying claimant based on retirement savings may represent 
policymakers’ obliviousness rather than design. Their image of the chronic poor has 
no place for retirement savings. To be sure, those rules originated in an era before 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and the like were 
widespread. But the large numbers of low-wage workers not covered, or vested, in 
pension plans have long had to make their own provisions to supplement Social 
Security. Whether through savings accounts, rental properties, or other means, these 
assets are essential to avoiding poverty in their old ages. The destitution-based 
model of the chronic poor, however, assumes that they will always be poor—and 
hence requires claimants to divest. This model makes no allowance for the  
acute poor. 
Filing unit rules can play similar roles. The destitution model assumes that the 
chronic poor are surrounded by other chronic poor people in their homes and 
families. It enforces this assumption by counting the income and resources of those 
people in determining a claimant’s eligibility.198 This can disqualify acutely poor 
claimants who remain embedded in more prosperous families. From a  
cost-reduction perspective, this may appear plausible: the friends and relatives 
taking in an acutely poor individual may have the theoretical ability to meet all of 
her or his needs. In practice, they may have reached the limit of their willingness to 
provide assistance when they made a spare room available to the individual. 
Requiring that the host’s circumstances be counted may effectively force the 
claimant to choose between the only available source of housing and public benefits 
eligibility. Although these filing unit rules can have similar effects on the chronic 
poor, more of those offering housing to the chronic poor are likely to be poor 
enough themselves not to eliminate financial eligibility. 
D. Flawed Efforts to Separate the Acute and Chronic Poor 
Although many of the acute poor’s difficulties result from their inability to 
meet requirements designed for the chronic poor, in some situations, policymakers 
have deliberately sought to treat the acute and chronic poor differently. Some 
important programs formally or informally bar the acute poor or treat them 
significantly less well than the chronic poor. In other situations, attempts to provide 
specifically for the acute poor have fallen victim to the toxic politics of  
chronic poverty. 
1. Programs that Expressly or Implicitly Require Chronic Poverty 
Because the acute poor are, by definition, in need for only relatively short 
periods of time, a host of timing rules can effectively disqualify many of them from 
 
198. SNAP counts the income and resources of any person living with, and purchasing and 
preparing food with, a claimant. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(m)(1)(B). Other programs may limit the counting of 
income to relatives living with the claimant. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(35) (2018) (requiring legally 
responsible relatives’ circumstances to be counted in determining eligibility for Medicaid). 
First to Printer_Super.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/26/20  6:12 PM 
1314 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1273 
aid. This is particularly true of requirements that need have a specified minimum 
duration, waiting periods, and benefits paid after great delays. 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) disability benefits are limited to those whose disabilities have lasted or are 
expected to last for twelve months and those whose conditions are expected to 
result in death. No matter how severely ill or injured—and no matter how 
completely unable to work—a worker may be, if she or he is likely to recover within 
a year she or he is ineligible for SSDI and SSI. Those injured on the job may be 
covered by workers’ compensation, although delays in processing claims and 
disputes about injuries’ causation often prevent the claimant from receiving timely 
aid. Those hurt in non-covered employment and those that become ill or injured in 
other ways—communicable disease, automotive accident, etc.—are unlikely to 
receive any help unless they are among the minority of employees covered by 
workplace disability policies. Few state or local governments have disability-based 
cash assistance programs for those not qualifying for SSI. 
Even those meeting SSDI’s durational requirement generally cannot receive 
Medicare coverage for twenty-four months. In addition to burdening chronic poor 
claimants for two years, this rule absolutely denies coverage to those acutely disabled 
for periods between one and two years. 
Other programs’ explicit “waiting periods” similarly have disproportionate 
impacts on the acute poor.199 For example, UC typically imposes at least a one-week 
explicit waiting period on new applicants. It also can require much longer waits for 
claimants who need their earnings in the current or just-completed calendar quarter 
to obtain insured status under UC. 
Housing presents a stark example of this. The acute poor’s problems with 
housing—manifested in homelessness—is relatively well-known and arouses broad 
public sympathy. Yet our major housing assistance programs exclusively serve the 
chronic poor. All have waiting lists that put housing out of reach for even acute 
poor families suffering relatively long bouts of poverty. Although the programs now 
do allow more near-poor families to qualify—indirectly covering some acute poor 
families by serving them even when they are not poor—this actually exacerbates the 
waiting lists because the expansion in eligibility was not accompanied by an 
expansion in the supply of subsidies. Thus, housing programs’ relative generosity to 
the chronic poor—by not matching eligibility limits to available supply—effectively 
closes these programs to the acute poor. What is left is a thin patchwork of 
emergency shelters run by some local governments and private charities that offer 
some of the worst housing conditions—lacking privacy and security for residents’ 
persons and property—in our society today. 
 
199. Thus, for example, a worker who is disabled for ten years will lose 20% of her or his 
potential Medicare coverage to the waiting period while five workers who are disabled for two years 
each—claimants who collectively will receive approximately the same amount in SSDI—will receive no 
Medicare coverage at all. 
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Programs relying on long accounting periods to determine need have the 
equivalent of a rolling waiting period.200 This is particularly true of programs 
administered through the tax system. These programs neglect the acute poor both 
because their long accounting periods can minimize or miss completely periods of 
acute poverty and often because of their delayed provision of aid. 
For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) bases eligibility on annual 
income. A family that experiences a bout of severe poverty that crosses from one 
year to the next may not have a low enough income in either year to qualify for a 
substantial EITC. Even if an acutely poor family does qualify, it will not receive 
assistance until months, often many months, later. By contrast, a family in chronic 
poverty will receive similar EITCs each year based on its circumstances during the 
prior year: EITC’s temporal mismatch will not cause them much harm, apart from 
the lack of aid during the family’s first year of low-wage employment. In theory, 
prior to 2010, the Internal Revenue Code allowed up to about 60% of a family’s 
anticipated EITC to be paid as part of its paycheck throughout the year,201 but this 
“advance payment” option never served more than about 1% of recipients. The low 
take-up rate of advance payment of the EITC results from both employers’ 
resistance and workers’ fear of incurring large tax liability if the advance payment 
proves excessive. This latter concern essentially reflects a recognition that EITC is 
not designed to serve the acutely poor and will punish those using it to help them 
through part-year episodes of need. 
The premium tax credits for purchasing insurance under the Affordable Care 
Act are only modestly better suited to the needs of the acute poor. It, too, relies on 
an annual accounting period that can miss or understate periods of acute poverty. 
It generally relies on circumstances in the prior year (as reflected in that year’s tax 
return, if any was filed) to determine current need, with limited provision for 
providing assistance to those having suffered economic reverses. It does provide 
aid on a current basis with a far more effective advance payment mechanism than 
the EITC. But because it claws back premium tax credits that exceed those 
subsequently determined with an annual accounting period, it effectively offers the 
acute poor only an opportunity to borrow assistance, with a requirement to repay 
by the following April 15.202 Most acutely poor people are uncertain when their 
 
200. This is by no means inevitable. For example, although SNAP uses retrospective accounting 
for certain ongoing recipients, it determines eligibility and benefits prospectively for new applicants 
and, even when accounting retroactively, can disregard terminated sources of income. 7  
C.F.R. § 273.21(g)(1)–(3) (2019). SNAP’s retrospective accounting does not reach back more than two 
months, yielding far more current assessments of need than those in the tax-based benefit programs; 
the need for adjusting benefits to meet current needs is far greater when a program relies on information 
a year or more in the past to determine need. 
201. 26 U.S.C. § 3507, repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 218, 124 Stat. 2403 (2010). 
202. If the family has received sufficient income in the first part of the year to render it ineligible 
for large premium tax credits when determined on an annual basis, it will not be able to receive more 
during a period of acute poverty in the latter part of the year. 
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fortunes will improve and are leery of putting themselves in a position to owe a 
large sum to the IRS if their hardship lingers. 
Even where a program does not impose an explicit durational eligibility 
requirement, its design can effectively deny aid to the acute poor in their time of 
need. For example, most states deny UC to workers who lose their jobs due to 
medical crises of their own or loved ones.203 SNAP denies benefits to many 
otherwise-eligible people who are acutely poor because of their enrollment in higher 
education;204 most states’ TANF-funded cash assistance programs effectively do the 
same thing.205 
At times, policymakers become so enamored of the idea of lifting up the 
dysfunctional chronic poor that they deny eligibility to the acute poor struggling to 
get by in the circumstances to which the acute poor are to be raised. For example, 
AFDC applied more favorable deductions to earnings from jobs obtained by 
recipients while on aid than to jobs that applicants already held.206 The TANF 
legislation similarly provides for exempting from resource consideration moneys 
that recipients deposit into Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) but makes 
no similar provision for assets already held by new applicants.207 
2. Displaced Hostility for the Chronic Poor Affecting the Acute Poor 
Programs nominally designed to aid the acute poor have all too often been 
damaged and distorted by fierce hostility to the chronic poor. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the most prominent program for the acute poor: UC. UC hugs the 
line between universal and anti-poverty programs: although it has no formal means 
test, it is available only to those without employment, steering most of its benefits 
to the poor and near-poor. It seeks to exclude the chronic poor by conditioning 
eligibility on substantial recent employment, by denying benefits to those with 
current barriers to re-employment, and by strictly time-limiting benefits. 
Yet fears that it might serve substantial numbers of the chronic poor have led 
to numerous harsh measures that exclude acutely poor workers. Its requirement that 
claimants’ prior employment be of a high intensity and duration make it unavailable 
to workers that had been maintaining themselves through intermittent or seasonal 
employment and to parents who combined work with caregiving. Its effective 
exclusion of people working as independent contractors excludes the acute poor 
 
203. CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, ADDRESSING 
LONGSTANDING GAPS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 (rev. 2007), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-20-07ui.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
6R8P-EJ3K]. 
204. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(e) (2018). 
205. While not explicitly denying aid on the basis of student status as SNAP does,  
TANF-funded programs commonly impose other time-consuming requirements that effectively 
compel claimants to drop out. Other examples exist. SNAP denies aid to those acutely poor because of 
one particular kind of economic calamity: a labor strike. Id. § 2015(d)(3); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(e). 
206. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
207. Id. § 604(d). 
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that run afoul of a large and growing segment of the contingent labor market. And 
the judgments it passes on the legitimacy of the cause of a claimant’s separation 
from prior employment reflect the same kind of moralizing common in programs 
for the chronic poor. The result has been that low and declining shares of the 
unemployed receive UC, even in severe recessions. Although a few states have 
moderated some of these rules, particularly in response to complaints about their 
gendered impact, at least as many states have tightened UC eligibility. Our political 
system finds it increasingly difficult to resist moralizing against all low-income 
people, acute and chronic alike. 
The most prominent means of distinguishing between the acute and chronic 
poor is a time limit on eligibility. Time limits, however, have several serious flaws. 
First, they often reflect wishful thinking about which needs are acute and which are 
chronic. After the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the most significant 
deduction from earnings for newly employed AFDC recipients ended after just four 
months, reflecting the preposterous assumption that low-skilled workers were no 
longer the “truly needy” and could fend for themselves after this time. Transitional 
Medical Assistance and Transitional Child Care programs typically provide six to 
twelve months of benefits to newly employed workers, implausibly implying that 
low-skilled employment somehow would begin to provide health insurance and 
wages sufficient to afford appropriate childcare within a short time  
after employment.208 
Second, because any time limit is inherently arbitrary, and no fixed line 
separates the acute from the chronic poor, these rules commonly disqualify 
significant numbers of acutely poor people. This is particularly true in the wake of 
devastating mass disasters, of “post-modern” recessions that typically lead to slow 
recoveries, and to those unemployed in a community whose economy has suffered 
major plant closures or similar calamities. But it is also possible where acute poverty 
springs from an extended but not infinite incapacity. Moreover, because one limit 
is unlikely to be demonstrably better than another at separating these groups, 
political and budgetary pressures to ratchet down the time limits prove difficult  
to resist. 
Finally, and relatedly, because time limits inherently involve arbitrary denials 
of aid to people in clear actual need, they establish a political precedent that can 
readily morph into much broader denials of aid to needy people. Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania pioneered time limits in their general assistance programs, 
emphasizing the relative virtue of the “transitionally needy” over those that were 
 
208. Transitional SNAP benefits arguably operate on a different, more defensible basis: they 
suspend virtually all reporting and verification requirements for five months when a household works 
its way off of TANF-funded cash assistance, almost always providing substantially greater benefits than 
the regular SNAP eligibility rules would. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(s). The assumption that the recipient will 
become better able to manage SNAP’s reporting rules once her or his employment situation has 
stabilized is probably founded, and a modest five-month benefits bonus seems a plausible  
work incentive. 
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“chronically needy” without good excuse.209 Within a relatively few years, they had 
eliminated these programs altogether.210 PRWORA imposed a five-year lifetime 
limit on assistance under its TANF block grant. Today, the fraction of poor families 
with children receiving cash assistance is lower than at any time since the 1950s. Yet 
most of the reduction springs not from the time limits themselves but from other 
measures that also deny aid to families in need whose legitimacy became impossible 
to attack after the principle of time limits was accepted. PRWORA imposed a  
three-month time limit for food stamps that the Administration proposes extending 
to Medicaid and housing assistance programs. 
E. Fiscal Policies 
Our lack of coherent, consistent fiscal strategy for income transfer 
programs211 results in irrational policy shifts whose timing is particularly harmful to 
the acute poor. Vocal concern about spending on anti-poverty programs is 
dominated overwhelmingly by attacks on the cost of programs for the chronic poor. 
Particularly during and after recessions, critics claim that those programs’ spending 
is “out of control” and paint a picture in which a substantially larger share of the 
population is becoming chronically dependent on government aid. Former 
Governor Mitt Romney’s famous categorization of 47% of Americans as “takers” 
is just one example of that phenomenon.212 
Yet the surging participation that is driving those complaints typically consists 
overwhelmingly of the acute poor (along with some who begin receiving aid as 
acutely poor and have difficulty returning to their prior circumstances because of 
extended economic weakness). And it is these influxes of the acute poor that drive 
major cutbacks on human services programs serving both the acute poor and the 
chronic poor. On the federal level, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1981,213 the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,214 PRWORA,215 the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005,216 and the 2014 Farm Bill217 all came in the wake of recessions when 
critics charged that participation in major public benefit programs was declining too 
 
209. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 54, at 283–85. 
210. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN 
WELFARE STATE 303 (2001). 
211. See Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, supra note 180 (finding much of current fiscal 
federalism pro-cyclical, exacerbating swings in the business cycle). 
212. Making and Taking: Distributional Politics and Growth, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY  
AM. (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2012/09/21/making-and-
taking [https://perma.cc/NKW2-R2W4]. 
213. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981: Titles III, VI, IX, XI, XXVI,  
Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357. 
214. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. 
215. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,  
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. 
216. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006). 
217. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649. 
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slowly. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982218 fit this pattern as well, 
although by the time it passed, a new recession had begun. The funding caps on 
programs that are not responsive entitlements, too, have their greatest impacts 
during recessions and the still-depressed economies that follow them.219 Programs 
with waiting lists, as noted above, become effectively closed to the acute poor, with 
chronic poor recipients unlikely to find the means of leaving and other chronic poor 
claimants already ensconced on the waiting list. 
The effect on the state and local level is even more dramatic. All state and local 
governments face legal or traditional requirements of balancing their operating 
budgets on an annual basis.220 This prevents them from freeing additional resources 
to assist the acute poor suffering from regional or national economic declines. 
Indeed, because those declines depress revenues, state and local governments 
commonly shrink anti-poverty programs precisely at the time large numbers of 
acute poor people need aid. As these program cuts further reduce demand in the 
state and local economy, spending and sales tax revenues fall further, fueling 
additional rounds of cuts. 
Efforts to mitigate the disproportionate impact of fiscal constraints on the 
acute poor have been halting at best. Federal “pay-as-you-go” budgetary rules,221 
which ordinarily require offsetting spending reductions or tax increases in legislation 
that expand benefit programs or cuts taxes, can be suspended in response to 
economic emergencies.222 That authority, however, is rarely invoked; the cost of 
spending (as opposed to tax cuts) enacted in response to recent recessions 
commonly has been offset,223 minimizing any positive macroeconomic effect and 
limiting the funds that could be made available to the acute poor. Indeed, leveraging 
the threat of a default on U.S. government debt, Congress induced President 
Obama to accept sweeping, across-the-board spending reductions in 2011 while the 
ranks of the unemployed were still swollen from the recession.224 
Somewhat better at meeting the acute poor’s needs is the structure of 
budgetary and responsive entitlements,225 such as UC and SNAP, which do not 
require new legislation to serve additional people qualifying in harsh economic 
 
218. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-273, 96 Stat. 763. 
219. David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 (2004). 
220. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, supra note 180, at 2592. 
221. 2 U.S.C. § 934 (2018). 
222. Id. § 907a(a). 
223. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 113TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 
COST ESTIMATE: BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT OF 2013 (2013) 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/costestimate/bipartisan-budget-
act-20130.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBC4-TV3M] (explaining that increased domestic spending would 
be offset with entitlement cuts and some revenue increases). 
224. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240. 
225. A budgetary entitlement is a federal program whose spending is not dependent upon 
annual appropriations acts. A responsive entitlement is a program whose rules provide for granting 
benefits to all claimants who meet specified criteria. Super, Political Economy of Entitlement, supra note 
219, at 652–55. 
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times. SNAP also contains authority for the USDA to liberalize eligibility conditions 
in areas hit by natural disasters without congressional action.226 UC’s time limits, 
however, render it insufficient to aid the acute poor struggling with the protracted 
job market weakness accompanying a recession.227 Congress has passed special 
extended benefit augmentations to UC in each of the past several recessions, but it 
has both been slow to start these programs and quick to end them;228 because 
liberals have been worried about being seen as expanding aid to the chronic poor, 
they have made no serious attempt to tie extended benefits to an economic formula 
rather than the need for new congressional action for each recession. 
States, in turn, could expand their ability to respond to acute poverty by 
building up large balances in rainy-day funds or by building up reserves in their 
TANF and other block grants. In practice, these balances, when they exist at all, 
have been far short of what was required to meet a significant share of the acute 
poor’s needs in even a modest economic slump.229 As a result, states have sharply 
tightened eligibility for anti-poverty programs within their control during recessions, 
disproportionately harming the acute poor in the short-term but weakening 
protections for all low-income people over the longer run.230 Moreover, high 
unemployment associated with the Great Recession of 2007–09 lasted longer than 
most states had anticipated in setting their UC taxes, resulting in the exhaustion of 
their trust funds and pressure to cut benefits to the acute poor as their programs 
subsisted on federal loans.231 
Even the way we keep and report records of expenditures in human services 
programs skews focus toward the chronic poor. Participation in SNAP, Medicaid, 
TANF-funded cash assistance and other important anti-poverty programs is 
reported as monthly averages. This leads naturally to dividing annual expenditures 
into this number to determine what appears to be an average annual benefit cost 
per person. In fact, however, many people participate for only relatively short 
periods in these programs. Thus, the actual number of people getting SNAP over 
the course of 2015 was not the average monthly enrollment of 45.8 million232 but 
 
226. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(h) (2018). 
227. STONE & SHAW, supra note 166. 
228. Id. 
229. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & KWAME BOADI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
WHY AND HOW STATES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR RAINY DAY FUNDS: RECESSION 
HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE OF FUNDS AND NEEDS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 1 (2011), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-3-11sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG3L-DJKT]. 
230. See Super, Laboratories of Destitution, supra note 154 (finding that states have structural 
impediments to responding reliably to the most serious needs of low-income people). 
231. Michael Leachman, Bill for Inadequate Unemployment Insurance Taxes Now Coming Due in 
Many States, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES ( Jan. 30, 2012, 5:29 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/
blog/bill-for-inadequate-unemployment-insurance-taxes-now-coming-due-in-many-states [https://
perma.cc/YF95-UDLQ]. 
232. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM STATE ACTIVITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 2 tbl.1, 4 (2016), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/FY16-State-Activity-Report.pdf  [https://perma.cc/ 
R9JB-DWGG]. 
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about half—again as many, roughly 70 million. Correspondingly, the average annual 
benefit for these 70 million would be $1,000 rather than the reported $1,500.233 
Expanding access to SNAP to more of the chronic poor might cost about $1,500 
per new recipient, but bringing in the same number of acute poor people would 
cost far less. 
III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO ACUTE POVERTY 
Discussions of how to respond to chronic poverty tend to have a certain 
sameness—and a deep futility. Massive redistribution goes fundamentally against 
the U.S. political culture.234 This country has tried coercive approaches 
extensively—most prominently in the implementation of the 1996 welfare  
law—and has failed to produce any secondary benefits that remotely offset the 
direct harm they inflict. Indeed, a significant body of research suggests that, by 
throwing low-income people’s lives into chaos and foreshortening their time 
horizons, these approaches may actually impede transitions to greater  
self-sufficiency.235 In between the redistributive and coercive extremes are two 
others: a social work–oriented group that holds up various local projects as models 
that could be emulated236 and policy wonks who suggest tinkering with existing 
programs.237 The social work and policy wonk approaches offer short-term political 
plausibility, yet they actually exacerbate the long-term political problem by making 
promises they cannot keep. As Blank points out, “[i]f we expect too much of any 
one program, we will inevitably be disappointed.”238 
Alleviating the hardships of acute poverty raises a very different set of strategic 
questions. First, the acute poor are far less prominent in political and academic 
discussions. Before the acute poor can win a debate, the debate must first occur. 
Second, as noted above,239 they lack a substantial political constituency. Those 
that seek to aid the chronic poor either do not consider, or find less compelling, the 
plight of the acute poor. Critics of the chronic poor, in turn, may find rhetorical 
advantage in differentiating the acute poor, but those whose goal is to shrink or 
dismantle anti-poverty programs generally have little reason to make a focused 
effort to preserve aid to the acute poor. And the stigma of poverty largely prevents 
 
233. See id. at 1 tbl.1, 55 tbl.45. 
234. MCCALL, supra note 152, at 196–201. 
235. Thus, for example, single mothers with the lowest incomes must spend a great deal of time 
cultivating the informal support networks on which they depend to meet short-term emergencies. EDIN 
& LEIN, supra note 55, at 149–58. See CYNTHIA MILLER, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH 
CORP., EXPLAINING THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM’S IMPACTS BY HOUSING 
STATUS (1998) (finding the beneficial effects of a welfare-to-work demonstration project concentrated 
among those receiving housing subsidies, perhaps because that afforded them a measure of stability). 
236. See EDELMAN, supra note 65 (holding up several education and training examples). 
237. See, e.g., David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control 
and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2010) (suggesting consolidation of federal 
housing assistance to facilitate offsetting the effects of carbon emissions controls). 
238. BLANK, supra note 57, at 292. 
239. See supra Section II.D. 
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their most logical allies—economically insecure people who were acutely poor in 
the past or are likely to become so in the future—from prioritizing their needs. 
“Good jobs” is a much more rousing political slogan, even if it often is one beyond 
the reach of government policies. 
Third, as a result of the political indifference to the acute poor, the dominant 
model for responding to their needs has been one of discretionary charity, which is 
grossly underfunded and ill-equipped to respond to their financial dilemmas. 
Finally, even those that would like to assist the acute poor often lack the 
understanding and empathy to do so effectively. The policies set out in the previous 
Part are far more ignorant than they are malicious, at least toward the acute poor. 
This Part offers some preliminary ideas on how we might more adequately 
meet the needs of the acute poor. Recognizing the obstacles to doing much for the 
acute poor, its goals are relatively modest, placing interventions within the general 
structure of existing U.S. public welfare law. Section A suggests a set of normative 
and practical principles for policies seeking to relieve acute poverty. Section B then 
gives specific examples of how those principles might be effectuated. 
A. Principles to Guide Responses to Acute Poverty 
One goal for any policy changes surely should be helping those experiencing, 
or fearing, acute poverty. This serves both obvious short-term humanitarian ends 
and can help prevent acute poverty’s destructiveness from threatening their return 
to relative prosperity. This also is a political necessity: the economically insecure 
have grown deeply cynical as their supposed interests have often been invoked to 
support policies that overwhelmingly benefited others.240 
But a second, also crucial, goal should be to aid the acute poor without further 
isolating them from the chronic poor. And to be clear, the chronic poor as a group 
face significantly more severe hardship than the acute poor: they experience almost 
everything that the acute poor do and much more beyond. They may have 
somewhat lower expenses and more expertise dealing with the social welfare system, 
but their reserves of informal assistance are more likely to be tapped out—as often 
will be their inner reserves of hope and determination. Policies that ameliorate the 
very real plight of the acute poor at the expense of the chronic poor would not 
enhance social justice.241 Fortunately, such trade-offs are unnecessary and indeed 
counterproductive for all concerned. 
Preserving and enhancing confluences of interests between the acute and 
chronic poor can benefit both. As politically weak as the chronic poor are, they are 
more likely to have a political identity as people benefiting from human services 
 
240. See, e.g., CHUCK MARR & CHYE-CHING HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
GOP TAX PROPOSAL RISKS A SUBSTANTIAL TAX SHIFT FROM HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS TO 
LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2011), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/11-18-11tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNK5-5CA3]. 
241. Duncan et al., supra note 113, at 88. 
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programs. The acute poor, in turn, are more like, and hence more sympathetic to, 
middle-income policymakers and voters. This could improve their standing in the 
politics of empathy and conceivably in power politics as well. 
An example of this kind of politics in the United States can be seen in health 
care reform. Single-payor advocates sought to improve health care coverage for 
everyone, hoping to harness the politics of universal programs. Although they could 
boast substantial efficiency savings, a major part of their political problem was that 
many of the middle-class people who would benefit from expanded benefits and 
simpler claims procedures were not sufficiently dissatisfied with their current 
benefits, and sufficiently valued their supposed independence from the 
government, that they provided little help against critics driven by gross cost, 
ideological opposition to expanding government, or industry-specific self-interest. 
The actual Affordable Care Act (ACA) combined conventional targeting of the 
chronic poor (that segment excluded from Medicaid) with protection to the acute 
poor that might lose health care coverage due to loss of employment or a medical 
crisis. Enough people could envision themselves experiencing acute poverty in this 
manner to give ACA enough political support to pass and to allow its political 
supporters to survive opponents’ onslaughts.242 Alas, ACA’s clumsy targeting, and 
particularly its dependence on annual accounting periods for determining eligibility, 
have helped to prevent it from being greeted enthusiastically enough by the 
economically insecure to make its coalition easily replicable. 
The key interests of acute and chronic poor people alike is to overcome the 
destitution model of assistance, which has humiliated the chronic poor and turned 
away the acute poor, and the discretionary charitable model of assistance, which has 
served primarily as an excuse for not helping in more substantial ways rather than 
as a source of assistance in its own right. Doing so will be challenging, as both of 
these models arose in response to fears about the moral hazard, and those fears are 
deeply embedded in U.S. political thinking. A frontal assault on them thus likely will 
fail. Substantial progress is possible, however, by reducing the influence that each 
of them enjoys and giving greater prominence to other models that can better meet 
low-income people’s needs while reducing economic insecurity. A great 
improvement would be a system that initially provides assistance to the acutely poor 
under more humane and trusting terms, only shifting to more austere approaches 
as an eventual fallback. 
B. Specific Remedies 
Assisting the acute poor outside of the destitution and discretionary charity 
models could be done in several ways. An obvious first step would be to repair and 
strengthen existing social insurance programs to assist a larger share of the acute 
poor. Requiring states to provide actuarially sound financing for UC, expanding it 
 
242. See Super, Modernization of American Public Law, supra note 163 (describing the long-run 
ramifications of ACA’s reordering of the politics of human services). 
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to cover kinds of workers that have become increasingly common since the 
program was designed—such as part-time workers, those in two-earner families, 
and those in the “gig economy”—would be important first steps. Legislation passed 
in response to the coronavirus pandemic shows how this can be done, but is 
unfortunately time-limited.243 Establishing automatic federal UC benefits for 
regional and national recessions (eliminating the need for one-off congressional 
legislation) and redesigning the federal loan system so that states are not asked to 
repay until their economies have recovered would also be particularly helpful to the 
acute poor. 
Some additional causes of acute poverty also are highly susceptible to coverage 
within social insurance models that are relatively familiar in this country. Paid family 
and medical leave would face fierce objections if funded by employers—directly or 
through an experience-rated tax like that supporting UC—but could appeal to a 
large enough segment of the population to work as a universal program. 
Some existing means-tested programs similarly are susceptible to reforms to 
make them more effective for the acute poor. “For a program to be effective against 
transitory poverty, it should be easy to get on it, easy to get off it, and easy to make 
a transition to other sources of income.”244 SNAP requires states to provide 
benefits within a week to the poorest third of applicants245 and within a month to 
all other eligible claimants.246 For SNAP to serve this function, however, it would 
need to restore full eligibility to the millions of childless adults currently subject to 
a three-month time limit. Concern for the acute poor helped drive the  
near-complete disappearance of vehicle resource limits and many states’ elimination 
of asset tests altogether;247 that should become national policy. Arguments about 
the acute poor also helped drive repeal of overbroad filing unit rules enacted in 
1981 and 1982.248 Both of these changes helped the acute poor and the chronic 
poor alike. 
The Affordable Care Act relies on the federal income tax system, which 
determines income on an annual basis, to administer its premium tax credits and, 
by extension, Medicaid. Shifting back to the monthly accounting period Medicaid 
historically had used would substantially improve access for the acute poor, but 
doing so is unlikely as it would require developing an entirely new administrative 
system. An expansion of current provisions for making more generous subsidies 
 
243. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 2102–2116, 
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
244. Bane, supra note 140, at 392. 
245. 7 U.S.C. § 2020I(9) (2018). 
246. Id. § 2020I(3). 
247. Super, Quiet “Welfare” Revolution, supra note 170, at 1347. 
248. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1984) (requiring most adult children to be in the same household 
with their parents if they live together and imposing the same requirement on most adult siblings), 
amended by Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987), 
and Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. 
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available to persons suffering adverse changes in circumstances249 could improve 
access to the acute poor if widely understood. So would the amelioration of the 
Act’s claw-back provisions for subsidies paid to persons during bouts of acute 
poverty whose annual income is greater;250 ironically, toughening the claw-back’s 
treatment of the acute poor is one of the very few amendments to the Affordable 
Care Act on which Democrats and Republicans have been able to agree. The need 
for a federal structure to identify people in need on a more current, rather than 
annual, basis became painfully obvious when Congress had to base eligibility for 
“advance refunds” of its new coronavirus tax credit on taxpayers’ income during 
one of the two previous years251—which may bear little relation to the 
circumstances of someone laid off in the recession. 
Beyond these existing vehicles, combining more and less generous 
programs—merging programs free from the destitution and discretionary charity 
approaches with programs built on those models—could help the acute poor. This 
would not require more affluent voters to abandon their concerns about moral 
hazard. Instead, it would grant limited aid, with limited risks, in the hope that such 
aid will suffice for large numbers of acutely poor people with the motivation and 
capability to end their bouts of poverty. In the process, it may reduce the number 
of acutely poor people that fall into chronic poverty and ameliorate some of the 
hardship of the chronic poor. 
First, states could advance federal benefit payments more broadly to those in 
acute need. A model for this is the interim assistance payments some states make to 
applicants for Supplemental Security Income while their applications are pending. 
When the Social Security Administration (SSA) approves those applications, it 
diverts part or all of the applicants’ retroactive benefits to reimburse the state for 
the interim assistance it provided.252 The state bears the risk that SSA will reject an 
application on which the state is paying interim assistance, but this mechanism gets 
benefits to people in severe need much more rapidly than SSA could at only a small 
fraction of the net cost of the payments made. In the same way, states could advance 
earned income tax credits and refundable child tax credits for workers that have 
suffered reverses.253 
Second, UC benefits should transition over the time an unemployed worker 
receives them, beginning as pure social insurance and gradually adopting more of 
the characteristics of a means-tested program. This is the essence of the German 
UC system. All unemployed workers initially participate in a very generous 
 
249. 42 U.S.C. § 18082(b)(2) (2018). 
250. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) (2018). 
251. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2301, 134 
Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6428(f)(1), (5)(A)). 
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g).  
253. Although employers for many years theoretically should have been making advance 
payment of EITCs to their workers, 26 U.S.C. § 3507 (repealed 2010), in practice only about 1% of 
them do so for a variety of administrative and relational reasons. 
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programs with relatively modest conditionality. Over time, its benefits phase down, 
increasing the financial pressure on the worker to seek and accept employment. 
Eventually, a still-unemployed worker is transitioned to a separate UC system that 
continues to provide subsistence benefits but with greater conditionality. Although 
concern for the acute poor’s needs likely play a relatively minor role in the design 
of the secondary program, leaving the chronic poor vulnerable by themselves, both 
groups participate together for an extended period in the initial program. A 
prerequisite for this approach’s effectiveness would be a dramatic expansion in the 
share of the unemployed covered by UC. The temporary Pandemic Unemployment 
Assistance program254 Congress established in March 2020 provides a valuable 
model for doing so and should be made permanent without linkage to the 
pandemic. 
And third, this country should join an increasing number of countries around 
the world255 in establishing a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program for  
low-income people. A CCT, in essence, provides monthly payments to individuals 
and families meeting some income threshold so long as the recipients comply with 
some basic behavioral conditions, such as school attendance and medical  
check-ups. A CCT that is not designed to meet all of a family’s needs could justify 
the sort of relatively modest conditionality that could avoid deterring many acute 
poor people from participating and demoralizing those that do. Yet this limited 
conditionality could help address policymakers’ and voters’ concerns about moral 
hazard that otherwise would afflict a simple transfer of cash or near-cash benefits. 
With benefits that do not strike more affluent persons as especially generous, 
advocates can plausibly argue that the hassle of signing up and of complying with 
the conditionality will suffice to deter insincere applicants.256 Setting the CCT’s 
benefits below the full cost of sustenance is unappealing, but this country’s history 
of allowing cash welfare benefits also to fall far short of meeting basic needs leaves 
little political room for a more generous, less demeaning program, at least until the 
CCT concept develops a committed constituency.257 CCTs have already been 
piloted in New York City and Tennessee with promising results.258 
The simplest way to initiate a CCT likely would be as an adjunct to an existing 
program. This would save the cost and political liability of establishing a separate 
 
254.   Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2102, 134 
Stat. 281 (2020). 
255. See KATHY LINDERT, WORLD BANK, SOCIAL SAFETY NETS CORE  
COURSE: CONDITIONAL & UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS (2013). 
256. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 193 (finding that such deterrence has 
become an increasingly important means of rationing public benefits in the United States). 
257. See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY 
FAMILIES (TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 10–13 (2014) (describing steady erosion in states’ cash assistance benefit levels to the point 
that even the most generous are far below the poverty line). 
258. JAMES RICCIO ET AL., MDRC, CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS IN NEW YORK  
CITY: THE CONTINUING STORY OF THE OPPORTUNITY NYC-FAMILY REWARDS DEMONSTRATION 
10 tbl.ES.2, 15 tbl.ES.3 (2013). 
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eligibility determination bureaucracy, as well as reducing the amount of additional 
bureaucratic sophistication the acute poor would need to show to obtain help. If 
UC was reformed to broaden the fraction of workers it covers, a CCT might take 
the form of a family supplement to CCT benefits, conditioned on children’s school 
attendance and health check-ups. Alternatively, it could function as a housing or 
clothing supplement to SNAP. As noted, SNAP currently excludes millions of very 
low-income childless adults; on the other hand, it has made great strides in reaching 
eligible low-income people beyond the chronic poor.259 Medicaid’s annual 
accounting periods, as noted, make it a problematic vehicle for reaching the acute 
poor, although both health-related conditions and the potential programmatic 
savings from ensuring that recipients can afford safe housing would have a 
compelling narrative nexus. 
CONCLUSION 
The sharp increase in attention to inequality has proceeded along two quite 
different lines. One addresses the runaway wealth of those at the very top of the 
distribution, such as “the one percent.” The other attends to those at the very 
bottom of the income and wealth ladder, the expanded ranks of the poor and of the 
extremely poor. The former line has received far more attention in the media and 
in political campaigns. This reflects Occupy’s efforts as well as the sense that the 
one percent’s ascendance is of potential concern to vast numbers of people. As 
concern about the one percent’s political influence accelerated as the effects of 
Citizens United v. FEC260 became clear, the top-regarding strain of inequality critique 
gained broader support. 
Yet the precipitous rise of populist insurgencies in both main political parties 
suggests that even those not especially interested in poverty need to pay more 
attention to those losing out due to rising inequality. Many of the angry rebels are 
the economically insecure, those that have experienced bouts of acute poverty or 
seen their friends and families do so. They are all too aware of the damage acute 
poverty can do, and they are gripped with fear that this damage will leave them and 
their children chronically poor. Although their criticism of the government focuses 
on economic management—trade, immigration, bailouts for big banks—they are 
keenly aware that public programs all too often did little to help them when they 
fell into distress. When they complain that our government cares little for people 
like them, they are all too right: our political system devotes far too little attention 
and money to people in economic distress, and when it does, it concentrates 
overwhelmingly (although not benignly) on the chronic poor. Although tens of 
millions strong, the acute poor are invisible in our midst. 
This invisibility, and demagogues’ efforts to turn the economically insecure 
against the chronic poor, must not be allowed to stand. The interests of the acute 
 
259. Super, Quiet “Welfare” Revolution, supra note 170. 
260. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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poor and the chronic poor overwhelmingly coincide. Neither the destitution model, 
predominately applied to the chronic poor, nor the discretionary charitable model, 
designed for the acute poor, are human or even efficient. A coalition of those 
concerned about all low-income people would have a far better chance of success 
than anything seen in anti-poverty politics since the Great Depression. 
The acute poor provide a face for low-income people that critics will find 
much harder to disparage. They also are far more integrated into the communities 
of middle- and upper-income people. The remarkable, sudden turnaround in public 
opinion about LGBTQ people,261 and their rights to full inclusion in society, 
resulted less from technical arguments than from the brave choice of millions of 
individual LGBTQ people to come out to those around them. Once straight voters 
realized that they knew lesbians and gays, who were no more or less flawed than 
other people in their circle, treating LGBTQ people as “other” became untenable. 
As Latinos/Latinas and Asian-Americans more commonly live and work alongside 
people from families longer in this country, the stereotypes driving anti-immigrant 
demagoguery face greater resistance. Advocates for people with disabilities, 
particularly for people with mental health challenges, have been pursuing a similar 
strategy that shows some early signs of success.262 
That has never seemed a particularly viable strategy for anti-poverty advocates. 
In our economically stratified society, a great many middle- and upper-income 
people really do not know well any chronically poor people. Few are likely to have 
a meaningful, empathy-building exchange with their janitors, gardeners, or even 
childcare providers. This distance continues to present abundant opportunities for 
opponents of anti-poverty programs to paint horrific tales of “behavioral 
poverty”263 to convince middle-income voters that something must be deeply 
wrong with the poor just as demagogues had demonized LGBTQ people and those 
with mental illness. 
The acute poor could provide a partial response to this enduring problem, 
serving as ambassadors to bring understanding of and empathy for low-income 
people generally. Large numbers of middle- and even upper-income people have 
suffered acute poverty on at least one occasion, and many more know someone 
who has. Seeing through them that poverty is overwhelmingly the result of 
economic conditions and bad luck rather than personal vice could transform the 
politics of poverty in this country. To be sure, knowing some “good” low-income 
people will not prevent more affluent people from accepting stereotypes of the 
 
261. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002) (predicting an evolution in legal arrangements giving same-sex 
partners gradually greater rights). 
262. Martha M. Lafferty, Tennessee Removes Discriminatory Questions from Attorney Licensure 
Application, DISABILITY RIGHTS TENN. (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.disabilityrightstn.org/resource
s/news/march-2014/tennessee-removes-discriminatory-questions-from-at  [https://perma.cc/BL5S-
FME2]. 
263. See, e.g., ROBERT RECTOR, HERITAGE FOUND., STRATEGIES FOR WELFARE REFORM 
(1993) (contrasting material poverty with behavioral poverty). 
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chronic poor, just as some people manage to bracket their friendships with people 
of color, LGBTQ people, or people with mental disabilities while maintaining their 
bigotries. But it can be a start. Expanding empathy for low-income people is 
becoming increasingly important as political attacks on them increase and as the last 
of those with personal memories of the Great Depression pass from the scene. 
To date, however, this country has made bouts of acute poverty so devastating, 
and so painful, that people feel the strong urge to put those episodes behind them 
without further thought, much less discuss their experiences with friends. Coupled 
with the powerful stigma against low-income people generally, this leaves huge 
numbers of people who could humanize the face of poverty very much “in the 
closet.” If anything, critics’ persistent if fanciful accounts of the supposedly opulent 
lifestyle provided by programs for the chronic poor may build resentment among 
acute poor people who are left largely to fend for themselves. Whether the 
widespread, common suffering resulting from the coronavirus pandemic legitimates 
the acute poor and brings them together with the chronic poor and other natural 
allies remains to be seen. 
Relieving the suffering of the acute poor is an important end in itself and one 
that anti-poverty advocates have far too long neglected. Their hardship is real and 
often extreme, the long-term harm they suffer can be as devastating to them as it is 
invisible to outsiders. And the cost of helping them is relatively modest because they 
typically need help for a shorter period. 
But more broadly, by helping the acute poor, we can help all low-income 
people. Many of the changes to anti-poverty programs necessary to assist the acute 
poor will also make an important difference for the chronic poor. More broadly, 
demanding that claimants for public aid assume a destitute, broken, and dependent 
role is brutalizing for acute and chronic poor people alike, exacerbates the fissures 
in our social fabric that poverty causes, and ultimately undermines the programs 
imposing those rules. If the chronic poor have any hope of escaping the isolation 
and ostracism they now suffer, tying their fate more closely to that of the acute poor 
is as politically indispensable as it is morally just. 
 
  
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